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Abstract
We develop a dynamic model of debt contracts with adverse selection and belief
updates. In the model, entrepreneurs borrow investment goods from lenders to run
businesses whose returns depend on entrepreneurial productivity and common produc-
tivity. The entrepreneurial productivity is the entrepreneur’s private information, and
the lender constructs beliefs about the entrepreneur’s productivity based on the en-
trepreneur’s business operation history, common productivity history, and terms of the
contract. The model provides insights on the dynamic and cross-sectional relation be-
tween firm age and credit risk, cyclical asymmetry of the business cycle, slow recovery
after a crisis, and the constructive economic downturn.
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1 Introduction
Financial markets exhibit asymmetric information in that one of the two parties in a financial
affair has more information than the other and information processing by the less informed
party to overcome the informational disadvantages. In debt contracts, for instance, lenders
usually know less than borrowers about payoff-relevant borrowers’ attributes. In response to
asymmetric information problems, the lender, in practice, estimates the borrower’s solvency
by looking at not only the borrower’s history but also the aggregate states in the past, because
the borrower’s financial state depends on aggregate economic conditions and the borrowers’
attributes. However, the dynamic construction of lenders’ beliefs about borrowers’ credit
risks considering the borrowers’ actions and economic states has received relatively little
attention to date.
In this paper, we develop a dynamic equilibrium model of debt contracts with adverse
selection and belief updates. We investigate how the information on aggregate economic
conditions in the past is used for constructing the lender’s belief about the credit risk of
borrowers with different histories. We study the dynamic evolution of the borrowing cost
as a borrower ages and the cross-sectional relationship between the borrower’s age and the
borrowing cost in a given period. We also analyze the effects of positive and negative aggre-
gate shocks on macroeconomic outcomes in the environment with asymmetrically informed
borrowers and lenders and with a dynamic belief update of lenders.
In the model economy, an entrepreneur can run his/her business using the lender’s in-
vestment good as inputs in each period. The return from business operations is a product
of common productivity and entrepreneurial productivity. The common productivity is a
random variable independently and identically distributed across time, and its realized value
is public information. Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous with respect to their entrepreneurial
productivity, which is the entrepreneur’s private information. To run the business, an en-
trepreneur must borrow the investment good from the lender, subject to limited commitment.
Unsecured credit is feasible in equilibrium due to the threat of punishment toward the de-
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faulters. In particular, if an entrepreneur defaults, then he/she will be excluded from the
future credit forever and hence leaves the economy. Bankrupt entrepreneurs are replaced
with new entrepreneurs whose productivity is randomly drawn from the given distribution.
The key novel ingredient in our model is that lenders can observe entrepreneurs’ business
operation histories, i.e., whether an entrepreneur operated his/her business in a specific
period in the past. The lender employs the entrepreneur’s business operation history in
conjunction with the information on the realized common productivity in the past and the
terms of the contract to construct his/her beliefs about the entrepreneur’s productivity,
which is the hidden type. Then, based on the constructed beliefs, the lender decides whether
to lend the investment good to the entrepreneur.
In equilibrium, where all entrepreneurs run their business, the only possible contract for a
group of entrepreneurs with the same operation history is pooling, and entrepreneurs default
only if they have no choice but to default. This implies that given a certain level of common
productivity and a group of entrepreneurs of the same age, there exists a threshold value of
entrepreneurial productivity such that only those entrepreneurs with a productivity lower
than the threshold value default and the other entrepreneurs honor the debt contract and
maintain the access to the credit market in the next period. Therefore, in the next period,
lenders can update their beliefs such that the productivity of the surviving entrepreneurs is
distributed above the threshold value.
Because more productive entrepreneurs tend to stay in the economy for a longer period
and less productive entrepreneurs are more likely to leave the economy early, the lender’s
belief about the entrepreneur’s productivity weakly improves over time in terms of first-order-
stochastic dominance. As a result, the borrowing cost weakly decreases as the borrowers get
older. Furthermore, in the model economy, older entrepreneurs tend to have a lower credit
risk and borrowing costs than younger entrepreneurs on average in a given period, although
the reverse is also possible under some conditions.
Our model also provides macroeconomic implications on the effects of aggregate shocks.
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First, the negative common productivity shock can change the distribution of entrepreneurial
productivity while the positive shock does not. As a result, the arrival of a recession is
prompt, and the recovery from a recession appears protracted in the model economy due
to the process of replacing less productive entrepreneurs with new ones over time. In par-
ticular, a big negative shock on the common productivity makes most of (or all) existing
entrepreneurs default, and it can take a long time for the level of aggregate production to
return to the pre-shock level, thus providing a narrative for the sluggish recovery of produc-
tion after a crisis (e.g., Ikeda and Kurozumi (2019)). Second, although the negative common
productivity shock reduces the current output, the model shows that under some conditions,
a mild negative shock on the common productivity can be constructive for the economy by
raising the aggregate production in the long term.
We are certainly not the first to study adverse selection problems in credit markets.
Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that credit rationing arises as a
means of market response to adverse selection.1 Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987a),
and Milde and Riley (1988) show that no credit rationing occurs in equilibrium if another
instrument, such as collateral and loan size, is used as a credit instrument in addition to
interest rates to screen borrower’s riskiness. Besanko and Thakor (1987b) extend the previous
papers and study the effects of credit market structure on the role of collateral and credit
allocation.
While these papers analyze credit markets with asymmetrically informed borrowers and
lenders, they study one time transactions focusing on how adverse selection problems are
related to crediting rationing practices. In contrast, we study the dynamic evolution of
lenders’ beliefs and the terms of debt contracts over time in response to the update of the
information on the histories of borrower’s actions and aggregate economic conditions in the
past.2 In particular, we use our model to provide insights on the relation between borrowers’
1Williamson (1986, 1987) also derives credit rationing as an equilibrium outcome using a costly state
verification model. However, in those models, entrepreneurs are ex-ante homogeneous, and hence there is no
adverse selection problem.
2While models of debt contracts with dynamic adverse selection are limited, several papers have studied
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ages and borrowing costs, the economic justification for the cyclical asymmetry of aggregate
outputs, and the effects of big and mild productivity shocks on the dynamics of aggregate
productions using the model of debt contract with adverse selection.
Boot and Thakor (1994) studied the dynamics of loan interest rates over the course of
a borrower’s life in a repeated game between a lender and a borrower with a moral haz-
ard. While the distinction between adverse selection and moral hazard in credit markets is
often subtle, the ways of incorporating the two frictions into the model profoundly differ be-
cause an asymmetric information problem occurs before the transaction in adverse selection
and moral hazard arises after the transaction. Furthermore, we introduce aggregate shocks
into the model to understand the interaction between aggregate shocks and lenders’ belief
construction, letting our model provide more macroeconomic implications.
Our paper is also related to the literature on unsecured debt contracts with limited
commitment and default history. Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Azariadis and Kass (2013)
study the conditions under which the first-best allocation is obtained in an economy with
limited commitment, and Kocherlakota (1996) shows that if individuals are not sufficiently
patient, imperfect diversification is optimal. Gu et al. (2013) and Bethune et al. (2018)
derive endogenous credit cycles in models of credit with limited commitment, and Sanches
and Williamson (2010) study a set of frictions under which money and unsecured credit
are both robust as a means of payment. While these previous studies show how unsecured
credit is supported by the threat of off-equilibrium punishment and determinants of the
credit limit, there is only potential default in those models, which is problematic given
the regularities in real-world default behaviors. Our model, by contrast, derives default as
an equilibrium outcome by incorporating adverse selection into debt contract models with
limited commitment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic environment
the multi-period adverse selection problems in other areas. For example, Kreps and Wilson (1982) consider a
finite-period model to show a high type’s precommitment to its action. Noldeke and van Damme (1990) and
Swinkels (1999) extend the Spence (1973) signaling model into a multi-period environment. Further, Kaya
(2009) and Toxvaerd (2017) consider the infinite-period environment when the sender’s type is persistent.
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of the model. Section 3 describes the bargaining game between borrowers and lenders.
Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium, and section 5 presents a number of implications of
our model. Section 6 concludes. The omitted proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
2 Model
Time is discrete and continues forever. Each period t is divided into two subperiods, morn-
ing and afternoon. Morning is the planning period, and consumption takes place in the
afternoon. There are two risk-neutral agents with a common discount factor β ∈ (0, 1)
across periods: A unit measure of entrepreneurs (E) and lenders (L). Specifically, the sets
of entrepreneurs and lenders are given as IE = [0, 1] and IL = [−1, 0), respectively, in the
real space. A lender lives indefinitely, but an entrepreneur may leave the economy and be
replaced by a new entrepreneur, which will be discussed later.
Each lender receives an indivisible endowment of one unit of an investment good in
the morning. The investment good can be lent to an entrepreneur or invested in a saving
technology that yields a certain return of r units of the consumption good in the afternoon
if one unit is invested in the morning and yields zero units in the afternoon otherwise.
Entrepreneurs do not receive endowments in the morning. Instead, each entrepreneur can
operate his/her business to produce a return of w units of consumption goods in the afternoon
by investing one unit of investment good in the morning. The outcome of the business
operation in period t ≥ 0 depends on the common productivity, At, and the entrepreneurial
productivity θ, as w = Atθ.
The common productivity, At, in period t ≥ 0 is independently and identically distributed
across time according to the uniform distribution with the support of [0, 1]. Entrepreneurs
can be different types with respect to their productivity θ, and the type (productivity) θ
is drawn randomly from the uniform distribution with the support of Θ = [θ, θ] when an
entrepreneur is born and is fixed until the entrepreneur leaves the economy. We assume
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that productivity θ is the entrepreneur’s private information, so only the entrepreneur can
observe the exact realized return of his/her business w = Atθ. However, we assume that
the cumulative distribution functions (cdf) of At and θ of new entrepreneurs are public
information. Throughout, U[a,b] refers to the cdf of uniform distribution with the support
[a, b]. For notational simplicity, we denote the cdf of the common productivity At as U(At)
instead of U[0,1](At).
An entrepreneur can leave the economy and be replaced by a new entrepreneur whose
productivity is drawn from U[θ,θ](θ). Therefore, the distribution of the productivity of en-
trepreneurs in period t > 0 can be different from U[θ,θ](θ). Let M be the set of all feasible
cumulative distribution functions on Θ, and let Ωt ∈M denote the cdf for the productivity
of entrepreneurs who live in period t ≥ 0. Because an entrepreneur may not run his/her
business in a given period, we denote the cdf Ω∗t ⊆ Ωt for the productivity of entrepreneurs
who run their business in period t. Then, the aggregate production in period t, denoted
by Yt, is given as Yt = At
∫ θ
θ
θdΩ∗t + rLh,t, where Lh,t is the mass of lenders who invest
endowments in the saving technology.
Business operation history We assume that the business operation history of an en-
trepreneur - whether the entrepreneur ran business or not in a given period - is publicly
observable, although the exact return on business operation of an individual entrepreneur
cannot be publicly verified. Specifically, consider an entrepreneur i ∈ IE who was born in
period s ≥ 0, and define ot for all t ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2, . . .} as follows: 1) oi,t = ∅ if t < s, 2)
oi,t = 1 if the entrepreneur runs his/her business in period t ≥ s, and 3) oi,t = 0, otherwise.
We define oi,t ≡ {o−i,1, oi,0, oi,1, . . . , oi,t} as a sequence of oi,t upto t ≥ 0. Let Ot denote the
set of all feasible sequences oi,t in a given period t and O = ∪
t∈Z+
Ot.
Entrepreneurs could have different operation histories, because they might be born in
different periods and some entrepreneurs may not run their business in some periods. An
operation history profile of all entrepreneurs in period t, denoted by Ot, is a measurable
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function from IE to Ot, which gives Ot(i) = oi,t for all i ∈ IE. Then, in the morning in
period t ≥ 0, Ot−1 is public information. If there is no risk of confusion, we abuse the
notation such that oi,t ∈ Ot if Ot(i) = oi,t for all i ∈ IE.
We use ot−1, dropping the index i ∈ IE, to state a particular operation history. We call a
group of entrepreneurs, who have the operation history ot−1, the “ot−1-group” in the following
analysis. Note that entrepreneurs’ types are two-dimensional: the productivity θ which is
unobservable and 2) the operation history ot−1 which is observable. Thus, (θ,ot−1) ∈ Θ×Ot
characterizes the entrepreneur’s type in period t ≥ 0.
Common productivity history In reality, most countries have an online portal system
that provides time-series data on gross domestic production (GDP), although the portal may
not provide time-series data of common productivity. Suppose that the aggregate production
Yt, which represents the GDP of the model economy, is observable. Then, by forming a
rational expectation about the distribution Ω∗t on the productivity of entrepreneurs who
ran their business in period t ≥ 0 and the mass of lenders Lh,t who invest endowments in
the saving technology, agents can correctly infer the common productivity as At =
Yτ−rLh,t∫ θ
θ
θdΩ∗t
.
Furthermore, any entrepreneur who runs his/her project in period t learns the common
productivity At from the realized return wt = Atθ because they know their type θ. For
these rationales, we assume that the history of the past common productivities is public
information to make the analysis straightforward. Specifically, in the morning in period
t ≥ 0, all agents can observe At−1 ≡ {A−1, A0, A1, . . . , At−1}, where A−1 = ∅. Let At denote
the set of all feasible sequences of At for all t ≥ 0 and A ≡ ∪
t∈Z+
At.
Bilateral meetings in the morning Entrepreneurs need to borrow investment goods
from lenders to run their business, and there is a decentralized market in which there are
bilateral meetings between entrepreneurs and lenders in the morning. Entrepreneurs and
lenders are randomly matched, and in each meeting, the entrepreneur offers a credit contract
that the lender either accepts or rejects.
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A specific form of a credit contract in a bilateral meeting is as follows. Under a contract,
a lender transfers one unit of investment good to an entrepreneur in the morning. Then, after
observing the return on the business operation w ∈ [0, θ] in the afternoon, the entrepreneur
emits a signal ws ∈ [0, θ] to the lender and pays R(ws) units of consumption good, where
R(·) is a function on [0, θ]. Note that the lender cannot observe the realized return on the
project because the productivity θ is private information of the entrepreneur, and hence the
repayment depends on the entrepreneur’s report ws.
We say that the borrower defaults on loans if he/she does not make payment R(ws) after
reporting the signal ws to the lender or does not make any payments without reporting
the signal, which is feasible because there is no external source of enforcement in the credit
market. However, we assume that there is a device that records the entrepreneurs’ default
history, and an entrepreneur who defaults on loans is permanently excluded from future
credit. For example, an entrepreneur can receive a discharge by filing bankruptcy, but
the bankruptcy document is stored in the publicly available court archive, and no lenders
will provide loans to that entrepreneur in the future. Because an entrepreneur cannot run
projects without borrowing the investment good from lenders, bankrupt entrepreneurs leave
the economy and are replaced with new entrepreneurs.
The important assumption in the model economy is that the information about the terms
of contracts and the payment amounts that each entrepreneur has made in the past are not
publicly observable. This implies that if an entrepreneur decides not to default, he/she
will always choose ws so as to minimize the payment to the lender, which implies that the
payment is constant, denoted by x = min
ws∈[0,θ]
R(ws). Thus, the payment x fully describes the
terms of a contract because the loan size is fixed, and we denote a credit contract by x in
the following analysis.
Potentially, the probability of providing loans can be a part of the debt contract. How-
ever, we assume that lenders also have a limited commitment in terms of the contract. Now,
suppose that a lender accepts a debt contract that specifies the repayment x and the prob-
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ability of loan provision α. The lender accepts this contract because he/she can achieve
a trade surplus by receiving the repayment from the entrepreneur. Then, in the case that
the lender and entrepreneur should not make the debt contract that occurs with probability
1− α, both parties have incentives to clinch the debt contract because it is optimal. Thus,
loan provision probability is ineffective and cannot be an instrument of debt contracts; hence,
the repayment x is the only instrument of debt contracts similar to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
Although ruling out the loan provision probability from the terms of the contract makes
the analysis straightforward without unnecessary distraction, it is not critical for obtaining
the main results. Even if we explicitly consider the loan provision probability in terms of the
contracts, we can still obtain the same results by constructing lenders’ out-of-equilibrium
beliefs appropriately, as is standard in signaling literature.
Parameter assumption Before describing the bargaining game and characterizing equi-
librium, we impose the following assumption on parameters throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 β >
b(θ)−
√
b(θ)2−4b(θ)r
θ
> 0 where b(θ′) = θ−θ
′∫ θ
θ′
1
θ
dθ
for all θ′ ∈ [θ, θ) and b(θ¯) =
limθ′→θ¯ b(θ
′) = θ¯.
Assumption 1 is a technical condition necessary for the existence of an equilibrium in
which all entrepreneurs operate their business. This assumption serves to streamline the
analysis by restricting attention to relevant cases. Assumption 1 requires that agents are
sufficiently patient. Because β < 1, it must be verified that the set {θ, θ, r, β} that satisfies
assumption 1 is not empty in advance before making further analysis. The next lemma
provides a sufficient condition for the set {θ, θ, r, β} that satisfies the assumption 1 to be
non-empty.
Lemma 1 If θ ≥ 4r, then there exists β ∈
(
b(θ)−
√
b(θ)2−4b(θ)r
θ
, 1
)
.
10
3 Bargaining game
In this section, we describe the bargaining game between the entrepreneur and the lender in
a bilateral meeting in the morning. To define the payoffs and strategies in the bargaining
game, it is useful to note that the entrepreneur’s value at the beginning of the morning is a
function of the productivity θ, operation history ot−1, and the history of common produc-
tivity At−1. This is because θ affects the realized return on his/her business and the set of
public information {ot−1,At−1} is used for constructing a lender’s belief about productivity
θ, which in turn affects the set of acceptable credit contracts. Let Vt(θ,ot−1,At−1) denote the
value function of a type (θ,ot−1) entrepreneur in period t ≥ 0, when the history of common
productivity is given as At−1.
The bargaining game between the entrepreneur and the lender in the bilateral meeting
has the structure of a signaling game in which the entrepreneur who has private information
about his/her hidden type θ makes an offer to the lender. We let x = ∅ if the entrepreneur
chooses not to offer a contract to the lender. A period t ≥ 0 strategy for the entrepreneur
specifies a contract xt ∈ X ≡ R+ ∪ ∅ as a function of (θ,ot−1,At−1), and a default set
Dt ⊂ [0, 1] as a correspondence of (θ,ot−1,At−1, xt) such that for all At ∈ Dt, the en-
trepreneur defaults on the loan contract xt. A period t ≥ 0 strategy for the lender is an
acceptance rule that specifies a set Bt⊂R+ of acceptable credit contracts. If there is no risk
of confusion, we drop arguments for each decision rule from now on; we use xt and Dt instead
of xt(θ,ot−1,At−1) and Dt(θ,ot−1,At−1, xt), respectively, for instance.
Note that an entrepreneur decides whether to default or not after observing the realized
common productivity At, and hence the return w = Atθ from the business operation. An
entrepreneur defaults on the credit contract xt for two reasons. First, if a type (θ,ot−1)
entrepreneur made a contract xt in the morning, then he/she has no choice but to default
for all At ∈
[
0, xt
θ
)
because he/she does not have sufficient resources to make the repayment.
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Second, when Atθ ≥ x, the entrepreneur strategically defaults on the credit contract xt if
xt > βVt+1(θ,ot−1 ∪ {1},At−1 ∪ {At}), (1)
and honors on the contract otherwise.
Payoffs Given the common productivity history At−1 in period t, the payoff for the type
(θ,ot−1) entrepreneur from the strategy profile (xt, Dt,Bt) is
v(θ,ot−1,At−1, xt, Dt,Bt)
= 1Bt(xt)

∫
[0,1]
AtθdU(At)+∫
[0,1]\Dt [−xt + βVt+1(θ,ot−1 ∪ {1},At−1 ∪ {At})] dU(At)

+ (1− 1Bt(xt))
∫
[0,1]
βVt+1(θ,ot−1 ∪ {0},At−1 ∪ {At})dU(At), (2)
where 1Bt(xt) is an indicator function that has the value 1 if xt ∈ Bt and the value 0
otherwise. If a contract xt is accepted, then the entrepreneur receives one unit of investment
good from the lender and runs his/her business which produces
∫
[0,1]
AtθdU[0,1](At) units of
consumption goods in the afternoon in expectation. Then, the entrepreneur repays xt units
of goods to the lender for all At ∈ [0, 1] \Dt and proceeds to the next period with an updated
operation history of ot = ot−1 ∪ {1}. If the entrepreneur defaults, then he/she consumes all
produced goods from the business operation and leaves the economy. On the other hand, if
the lender rejects the contract xt, the entrepreneur does not run his/her business in period
t and enters the next period with ot = ot−1 ∪ {0}.
The lender’s payoff function is
{∫
[0,1]\Dt(θ,xt,ot−1,At−1)
xtdU(At)
}
1Bt(xt) + r (1− 1Bt(xt)) , (3)
where we explicitly specify the default sets as a correspondence of (θ, xt,ot−1,At−1) to clarify
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that (3) is the lender’s payoff when the lender is offered a contract xt from the type (θ,ot−1)
entrepreneur when the common productivity history is given by At−1.
Belief system Because θ is the entrepreneur’s private information, the lender needs to
form beliefs about the entrepreneur’s productivity θ before making an acceptance decision
on the proposed contract xt. To specify the lender’s belief system, it is useful to make the
following two observations. First, entrepreneurs, in the model economy, can be grouped
by their operation history and each group can have a different distribution for θ of the
entrepreneurs in that group. Second, the cdf for θ of entrepreneurs in each group depends
on the realization of the common productivity in the past because the entrepreneur’s default
decision depends on the realized common productivity. Let Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1) denote the cdf
of θ of entrepreneurs in the ot−1-group in the morning in period t ≥ 0 when the common
productivity history is At−1.
Because {Ot−1,At−1} is public information in the morning of period t, lenders can form a
rational expectation about Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1) for all ot−1 ∈ Ot−1, which provides useful informa-
tion for their belief construction. Furthermore, lenders use the terms of contract xt for belief
construction as is standard in signaling literature. As a result, the lender uses (xt,ot−1,At−1)
to construct the belief. Specifically, we write Φ : X × O × A→M for the lender’s belief
function, assigning a cdf for θ of the matched entrepreneur in a bilateral meeting upon ob-
serving (xt,ot−1,At−1). Thus, Φ(θ|xt,ot−1,At−1) is the lender’s conditional belief that the
distribution for θ of an entrepreneur, who has the operation history ot−1 and offers xt, when
the lender observes (xt,ot−1,At−1) ∈ X ×O × A.
Optimal strategy Given the lender’s acceptance rule Bt and the common productivity
history At−1, the type (θ,ot−1) entrepreneur optimally chooses the strategy (xt, Dt). Note
that the entrepreneur can always choose not to offer a contract to the lender, i.e., xt = ∅.
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Thus, the entrepreneur’s problem in period t is
max
xt∈X,Dt⊂[0,1]
{v(θ,ot−1,At−1, xt, Dt,Bt)} , (4)
where Dt = ∅ whenever xt = ∅. Note that the (θ,ot−1) entrepreneur, in principle, can offer
a contract xt ∈ X\Bt, which will be rejected by the lender with certainty. However, this is
the same as not making an offer, and we assume that the entrepreneur chooses not to offer
a contract instead of offering a contract that will be rejected in the following analysis.
Next, given a belief system Φ, the operation history of the matched entrepreneur ot−1,
and common productivity history At−1, the set of acceptable contracts for a lender is
B∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1) =
{
xt ∈ R+ :
∫
θ
∫
[0,1]\Dt
xtdU(At)dΦ(θ|xt,ot−1,At−1) ≥ r
}
. (5)
For a contract to be acceptable, the expected revenue from the entrepreneur’s repayment
should not be lower than the payoff from investing the investment good in the saving technol-
ogy that yields r units of consumption goods in the afternoon with certainty. We assume that
a lender accepts a contract that makes the lender indifferent between accepting or rejecting
the contract.
4 Equilibrium
We adopt Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as our equilibrium concept for the bargaining
game, which is formally stated in the following definition.
Definition 1 An equilibrium of the bargaining game is a profile of strategies for the en-
trepreneur and the lender, and belief system, 〈{xt, Dt} ,Bt,Φ〉∞t=0, such that for all t ≥ 0, 1)
{xt(θ,ot−1,At−1), Dt(θ,ot−1,At−1, xt)} is a solution to (4) for all (θ,ot−1,At−1) ∈ Θ×O×A,
2) Bt = B∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1) for all (ot−1,At−1) ∈ O×A, and 3) Φ : X×O×A→ [0, 1] satisfies
Bayes’ law whenever it is applicable.
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Before characterizing equilibrium, we first show a property of the entrepreneur’s optimal
strategy for xt in the next lemma, which provides a useful intermediate step for equilibrium
characterization.
Lemma 2 Take any (ot−1,At−1) ∈ O × A and θ ∈ supp
(
Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1)
)
. If the type
(θ,ot−1) entrepreneur offers a contract xt ∈ B∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1) in equilibrium, then it must be
xt = min {B∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1)}.
Lemma 2 says that the type (θ,ot−1) entrepreneur either does not make an offer, i.e.,
xt = ∅, or offers a contract xt = min {B∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1)} that does not depend on θ. This
implies that the lender cannot use the terms of the contract effectively to update the belief
about θ of the matched entrepreneur.
The result of a pooling contract in lemma 2, however, only applies to entrepreneurs who
offer contracts. In particular, given (ot−1,At−1), the entrepreneur can always choose not to
make an offer, i.e., xt = ∅, if he/she expects that he/she could have a much better deal in the
next period by updating his/her operation history with {0} instead of {1}. Depending on
how the lender’s belief system Φ is constructed, multiple equilibria can exist. For example,
in one equilibrium, some entrepreneurs do not make offers taking a break from their business
in some period to obtain a better deal in the future, while in another equilibrium, all alive
entrepreneurs offer contracts in bilateral meetings to raise funds for their business operations.
In reality, most of the firms run their business continuously from the beginning rather
than stop running their business occasionally. Thus, in the following analysis, we concen-
trate on a case in which all alive entrepreneurs run their business every period until they
leave the economy, which we call the “full production equilibrium”. Note that in the full
production equilibrium, all entrepreneurs make credit contracts with lenders until they leave
the economy. Thus, the necessary condition for the existence of full production equilibrium
is B∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1) 6= ∅ for all (ot−1,At−1) ∈ O∗t−1 × At−1, where
O∗t−1 = {ot−1 ∈ Ot−1 : os 6= 0 for all s ≤ t− 1} ,
15
for all t ≥ 0. Here, O∗t−1 is the set of feasible ot−1 in full production equilibrium and let
O∗ = ∪
t∈Z+
O∗t .3 Also, given B∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1), entrepreneurs must have an incentive to offer
contracts to lenders. As a result, focusing on full production equilibrium puts discipline on
the lender’s belief Φ off the equilibrium path.
Even though focusing on full production equilibrium narrows down equilibria of the orig-
inal game by disciplining the lender’s beliefs effectively, it does not guarantee a unique
equilibrium outcome in general. Because there is little discipline on the belief Φ for out
of equilibrium offer x, the game in bilateral meeting admits a continuum of equilibria.
Specifically, we show, in Appendix B, that there exists a subset χ ⊂ R+ such that for any
x′ ∈ χ, an equilibrium exists with {xt(θ,ot−1,At−1), Dt(θ,ot−1,At−1, xt)} =
{
x′,
[
0, x
′
θ
)}
for all θ ∈ supp
(
Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1)
)
and x′ ∈ Bt. To focus on the main issues of the pa-
per, we restrict our attention to the full production equilibrium with the lowest x for each
(ot−1,At−1) ∈ O × A, which we denote by the e∗ equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Full production equilibrium exists and in the e∗ equilibrium, for any ot−1 =
{∅, . . . os−1, . . . ot−1} ∈ O∗, where s ∈ {0, . . . t} is the birthdate of ot−1-group entrepreneurs,
and any At−1 ∈ A, if supp
(
Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1)
)
6= ∅, then the following conditions hold:
1. There exists θ̂t ∈ [θ, θ] such that Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1) = U[θ̂t,θ]
2. For all θ ∈ supp
(
Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1)
)
= [θ̂t, θ], the type (θ,ot−1) entrepreneur offers the
contract
x∗(θ̂t) ≡
b(θ̂t)−
√
b(θ̂t)2 − 4b(θ̂t)r
2
, (6)
and chooses the default set Dt =
[
0, x
∗(θ̂t)
θ
)
,
3. For τ = s, . . . t, θ̂τ = min supp
(
Γ̂τ (oτ−1,Aτ−1)
)
, where oτ−1 and Aτ−1 be the truncated
subsequences of ot−1 and At−1 such that oh and Ah are removed for all h > τ , is given
3Note that in the full production equilibrium, the birthdate of an entrepreneur represents his/her opera-
tion history.
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as
θ̂s = θ and θ̂τ = max
{
x∗(θ̂τ−1)
Aτ−1
, θ̂τ−1
}
for τ = s+ 1, . . . t. (7)
Proposition 1 shows the existence the e∗ equilibrium, and describes the entrepreneur’s
strategy and the dynamics of the distribution for θ of entrepreneurs with a particular op-
eration history (and hence the dynamics of lender’s beliefs on the equilibrium path) in the
e
∗ equilibrium. We discuss implications of proposition 1 with intuitive explanations for its
results in what follows.
First, in the e∗ equilibrium, entrepreneurs do not default strategically and defaults only
if they cannot honor the credit contract, i.e., Dt =
[
0, x
∗(θ̂t)
θ
)
. The intuition for this re-
sult is as follows. In the full production equilibrium, the lender’s belief system satisfies
B∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1) 6= ∅ for all (ot−1,At−1) ∈ O∗ × A. Thus, the entrepreneur can always
choose to offer an acceptable contract and default on the contract, and the expected payoff
from this strategy is θ
2
. This implies that Vt+1(θ,ot,At) ≥ θ2 . Then, by the definition of
x∗(θ̂t) given in (6), x∗(θ̂t) <
βθ
2
for all θ ∈ [θ̂t, θ], detailed in the proof, which implies that
x∗(θ̂t) < βVt+1(θ,ot,At). As a result, the entrepreneur defaults only if he/she has no choice
but to defeault. Hence, the default set is connected as Dt =
[
0, x
∗(θ̂t)
θ
)
.
Second, the connected default set is a driving force for the first and third parts of propo-
sition 1. To gather intuition, consider entrepreneurs whose θ was randomly drawn from U[θ,θ]
when they were born in period s ≥ 0 as an example. Letting θ̂s = θ, the second part of propo-
sition 1 says that for all θ ∈ [θ̂s, θ], the θ entrepreneur offers x∗(θ̂s) to the lender and defaults
only if As <
x∗(θ̂s)
θ
. Therefore, only entrepreneurs with θ ≥ x∗(θ̂s)
As
can survive moving to the
next period by making the repayment and the set of θ for survived entrepreneurs in period
s+ 1 is
[
θ̂s+1, θ
]
, where θ̂s+1 = max
{
x∗(θ̂s)
As
, θ
}
as stated in the third part of proposition 1.
Furthermore, because θ is uniformly distributed at period s, θ of survived entrepreneurs in
period s+1 is also uniformly distributed as Γ̂s+1(os,As) = U[θ̂s+1,θ] as stated in the first part
of proposition 1. Note that the above argument holds as long as the initial distribution of θ
is the uniform distribution over the connected set of θ, and hence, by induction, it applies
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for any entrepreneur with any operation history in any period.
Third, the entrepreneur’s strategy (xt, Dt) =
(
x∗(θ̂t),
[
0, x
∗(θ̂t)
θ
))
maximizes the en-
trepreneur’s trade surplus subject to the lender’s participation constraint. Obviously, the
entrepreneur’s trade surplus decreases with the repayment xt. However, the entrepreneur
cannot decrease xt unlimitedly because of the lender’s participation constraint. Specifically,
given that Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1) = U[θ̂t,θ] and all entrepreneurs in the ot−1-group offers the same
contract xt, the lender’s expected payoff from accepting the contract xt is
ω(xt,ot−1,At−1) =
∫
θ
∫
[0,1]\Dt(θ,xt,ot−1,At−1)
xtdU(At)dU[θ̂t,θ](θ). (8)
where Dt(θ, xt,ot−1,At−1) is the optimal default strategy for the entrepreneur θ ∈ [θ̂t, θ].
As one can see from (8), ω(xt,ot−1,At−1) decreases with the measure ofDt(θ, xt,ot−1,At−1).
Thus, the entrepreneur can decrease xt without changing the value of ω(x,ot−1,At−1) by re-
ducing the measure of the default set. By imposing the smallest default set, Dt =
[
0, xt
θ
)
,
into (8) and using the definition of b(·) in assumption 1, we obtain
ω(x,ot−1,At−1) = x− x
2
b(θ̂t)
. (9)
Then, the lowest xt that satisfies ω(xt,ot−1,At−1) = r is x∗(θ̂t) defined in (6). Also, the
second part of proposition 1 shows that given x∗(θ̂t), it is optimal for the entrepreneur to
set the default set as Dt =
[
0, x
∗(θ̂t)
θ
)
. Given that the lender correctly forms the belief about
the entrepreneur’s productivity, i.e., Φ(θ|x∗(θ̂t),ot−1,At−1) = Γ̂t(ot−1, At−1), in equilibrium,
the lender accepts the contract x∗(θ̂t). Therefore, x∗(θ̂t) is the lowest repayment that the
entrepreneur can offer to the lender, maximizing the entrepreneur’s trade surplus.
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5 Applications
In this section, we consider two applications of our model. In section 5.1, we assess the
relation between the entrepreneur age and credit risk. In section 5.2, we study the effects
of common productivity shocks on the dynamics of aggregate production over time. In the
following analysis, whenever we say equilibrium, we mean the e∗ equilibrium.
5.1 Entrepreneur age and credit risk
There have been extensive studies on the determinants of firms’ default probabilities, and
the firm age has been argued as one of the determinants of default probabilities. In this
subsection, we use our model to study the relation between the entrepreneur’s age and
credits risk, both dynamically and cross-sectionally.
Measuring the credit risk What is the credit risk that lenders face when they lend the
investment good to entrepreneurs? In a bilateral meeting, the lender cannot directly observe
the entrepreneur’s productivity, and the lender must estimate the entrepreneur’s credit risk
based on the lender’s belief Φ.
In the e∗ equilibrium, the productivity θ of the ot−1-group entrepreneurs is uniformly
distributed over [θ̂t, θ] as described in proposition 1. Because the lender’s belief follows the
Bayes’ rule on the equilibrium path, it must be Φ(·|xt,ot−1,At−1) = U[θ̂t,θ]. Then, given that
the entrepreneur does not default strategically, the lender perceives that the ax-ante default
probability, denoted by λt, of the entrepreneur with ot−1 in period t is
λ(θ̂t) =
∫
[θ̂t,θ¯]
x∗(θ̂t)
θ
dU[θ̂t,θ]. (10)
Because θ̂t is an equilibrium outcome that depends on (ot−1,At−1) as one can see from
proposition 1, λt depends on (ot−1,At−1).
Lemma 3 The default probability λ(θ̂t), defined by (10), decreases with θ̂t.
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Lemma 3 says that λt decreases with θ̂t, which is intuitive. As θ̂t rises, the average
productivity of entrepreneurs in the ot−1-group increases. Furthermore, x∗
(
θ̂t
)
decreases
with θ̂t as one can see from (6). Combined together, the default probability λt decreases
with θ̂t, and hence, θ̂t inversely captures an entrepreneur’s credit risk.
Evolution of credit risk over time We first analyze the dynamic evolution of the en-
trepreneur’s credit risk perceived by lenders over the entrepreneur’s life. Consider an en-
trepreneur who was born in period s ≥ 0 and is alive in period t > s. The lender’s belief
about the entrepreneur’s productivity θ in the past period τ ∈ {s, . . . t − 1} is given as
Φ(·|xτ ,oτ−1,Aτ−1) = U[θ̂τ ,θ], where θ̂τ is given by (7). As one can see from (7), θ̂τ weakly
increases with τ until the entrepreneur leaves the economy, meaning that the lender’s belief
about the entrepreneur’s productivity improves over time in terms of first-order-stochastic
dominance, as the entrepreneur becomes older. The improvement of belief, in turn, reduces
the entrepreneur’s credit risk and the repayment on the credit contract, as stated in the next
proposition.
Proposition 2 In the e∗ equilibrium, the entrepreneur’s credit risk and demanded repay-
ment weakly decrease as the entrepreneur gets older.
The results of proposition 2 are consistent with the empirical findings in Berger and Udell
(1995) and Agarwal and Gort (2002), which document a decline of the firms’ default risk
and the firm’s borrowing cost, respectively, over time. The intuition for the improvement
of the lender’s belief about the entrepreneur’s productivity and the results of proposition 2
is in line with our earlier observations. In equilibrium, an entrepreneur honors the credit
contract as far as possible and defaults only if he/she does not have enough income, which is
a product of the common productivity and the entrepreneur’s productivity. Thus, honoring
the credit contract in each period indicates that the entrepreneur’s productivity is above a
certain level, which updates the lender’s belief. This, in turn, decreases the entrepreneur’s
perceived credit risks and the demanded repayment.
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On a related point, Boot and Thakor (1994) construct a repeated game between a lender
and a borrower with a moral hazard problem and demonstrate that loan interest rates de-
cline over time. Although the theoretical prediction is similar to that of ours, the primary
mechanism is different. In Boot and Thakor (1994), the borrowing cost decreases as a bor-
rower gets older because a decreasing sequence of interest rates incentivizes a borrower to
invest more effort into his/her project. On the other hand, we show that borrowing costs
can decrease throughout the borrower’s life as a result of information learning in a credit
market where adverse selection problems exist, complementing previous studies.
Cross-sectional differences in credit risk In the model economy, entrepreneurs leave
the economy after defaulting on credit contracts and are replaced by new entrepreneurs.
Thus, the economy consists of different age groups of entrepreneurs in a given period, and
each age group could have different credit risk. We show, in proposition 2, that the credit
risk of an individual entrepreneur decreases throughout his/her life. Does it imply that old
entrepreneurs have a lower credit risk than young entrepreneurs in a given period?
Consider two entrepreneurs: an old entrepreneur and a young entrepreneur with operation
histories oot−1 and o
y
t−1, respectively in period t > 0. Let s < t be the period when the young
entrepreneur was born and suppose that the old entrepreneur was born before the period
s. As described in lemma 3, θ̂it = min supp
(
Γ̂t(o
i
t−1,At−1)
)
for i = {o, y} is a sufficient
statistic for the lender’s belief about the entrepreneur’s productivity and the entrepreneur’s
credit risk. Thus, we focus on comparing θ̂ot and θ̂
y
t in period t in the following analysis.
Note that θ̂ys = θ and θ̂
o
s ≥ θ by the results of proposition 2. Assume that θ̂os > θ because
if θ̂os = θ, then θ̂
y
t = θ̂
o
t for all period t > s until one of them leaves the economy after filing
bankruptcy. In period s, the old and young entrepreneurs offer x∗
(
θ̂os
)
and x∗ (θ) to the
matched lenders, respectively. Then, assuming that both the old and young entrepreneurs
do not default in period s, we obtain θ̂os+1 = max
{
x∗(θ̂os)
As
, θ̂os
}
and θ̂ys+1 = max
{
x∗(θ)
As
, θ
}
,
respectively, from (7). Because x∗
(
θ̂os
)
< x∗ (θ) given the assumption that θ̂os > θ, if
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θ̂os <
x∗(θ̂ys )
As
, it must be θ̂ys+1 > θ̂
o
s+1, which means that the young entrepreneur has a lower
credit risk than the old entrepreneur in period s+ 1. Thus, in this economy, the reversal of
credit risk between the old and young entrepreneurs can occur depending on the realization
of the common productivity. However, the next proposition shows that if θ is sufficiently
high, then the reversal of credit risk does not occur on average in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 In the e∗ equilibrium, for any t ≥ 0, At−1 ∈ A, and oot−1,oyt−1 ∈ O∗, if
min supp
(
Γ̂t(o
y
t−1,At−1)
)
< min supp
(
Γ̂t(o
o
t−1,At−1)
)
and θ ≥ 4r, then
EAt
[
θ̂ot+1 − θ̂yt+1| supp
(
Γ̂t+1(o
i
t−1 ∪ {1},At−1 ∪ {At})
)
6= ∅ for i = {o, y}
]
> 0
where θ̂it+1 = min supp
(
Γ̂t+1(o
i
t−1 ∪ {1},At−1 ∪ {At})
)
for each i = {o, y}.
Proposition 3 means that an entrepreneur with a lower credit risk than another en-
trepreneur in the current period maintains a lower credit risk on average in the next period.
This implies that old entrepreneurs tend to have a lower credit risk than young entrepreneurs
on average because when young entrepreneurs were born, it is more likely that the old en-
trepreneurs had a lower credit risk than new entrepreneurs.
The negative effects of a firm’s age on the firm’s default probability have been well
documented in empirical studies using cross-sectional data.4 The supporting argument of
those studies is that young firms are more sensitive to external shocks and hence are expected
to show higher bankruptcy probabilities than old firms. Through the lens of our model, old
firms’ adaptiveness results from the fact that only good firms can deal with a negative
external shock and survive for a longer time and hence can get older.
4See Altman (1968), Eklund et al. (2001), Benito et al. (2004), Bhimani et al. (2010), and Belaid (2014),
for empirical studies.
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5.2 Common productivity and aggregate production
In this subsection, we study the effects of common productivity on the dynamics of aggregate
production. In the full production equilibrium, the aggregate production in period t is given
as Yt = At
∫ θ
θ
θdΩt, where Ωt is the cdf for θ of entrepreneurs who are alive in period t. The
common productivity affects the aggregate production through two channels.
First, At has a direct effect on Yt in period t because entrepreneurs’ return on their
project is a product of the entrepreneurial productivity and common productivity. Second,
the common productivity affects the aggregate production through the cdf Ωt for θ of alive
entrepreneurs. Because Aτ in period τ < t affects the type of entrepreneurs who defaulted
in period τ and defaulted entrepreneurs are replaced with new entrepreneurs, the current
cdf, Ωt, in period t depends on the common productivity in the past At−1. For instance, all
entrepreneurs offer x∗ (θ) in period 0, and only entrepreneurs with θ ≥ x∗(θ)
A0
survive in period
0. If x
∗(θ)
A0
> θ, entrepreneurs with θ ∈
[
θ, x
∗(θ)
A0
)
default in period 0 and are replaced with
new entrepreneurs in period 1. Thus, the cdf Ω1 in period t is an average of two distributions
U[x∗(θ)
A0
,θ
] and U[θ,θ] weighted by the measure of each distribution, and hence, Ω1 depends on
the realization of A0. Then, by induction, the cdf Ωt must depend on At−1. Given a sequence
A = {Aτ}∞τ=−1 ∈ A∞, we can express the aggregate production in period t as a function of
A such that
Yt = At
∫ θ
θ
θdΩt(θ|At−1) ≡ Ŷt(A), (11)
where At−1 = {Aτ}t−1τ=−1 is a subsequence of A and Ωt(θ|At−1) is the associated cdf for θ of
alive entrepreneurs in period t given At−1.
In general, it is hard to trace Ωt and Yt over time because the realization of the common
productivity in each period is randomly drawn from U[0,1]. To gather the intuition about
the dynamics of Ωt(θ|At−1) and Yt over time, we study a special case in which the realized
common productivity is constant such that At = A˜ ∈ [0, 1] for all t ≥ 0. For notational
convenience, when Aτ = A˜ for all τ ≥ 0, we denote the sequence of common productivity by
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A˜t = {Aτ}t−1τ=−1 and A˜ = {Aτ}∞τ=−1.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the realized common productivity is constant at A˜ ∈ [0, 1], i.e.,
At = A˜, for all t ≥ 0 in the e∗ equilibrium.
1. If A˜ ∈
[
0, x
∗(θ)
θ¯
]
∪
[
x∗(θ)
θ
, 1
]
, then Ωt
(
θ|A˜t−1
)
= U[θ,θ] and Ŷt
(
A˜
)
= A˜(θ+θ¯)
2
for all
t ≥ 0.
2. If A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
, then, letting ∆ ≡
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
−θ
θ¯−θ
)
,
Ωt
(
θ|A˜t−1
)
=

∆t θ−θ
θ¯−θ for θ ≤ x
∗(θ)
A˜
∆t θ−θ
θ¯−θ + (1−∆t)
θ−x∗(θ)
A˜
θ¯−x∗(θ)
A˜
for θ > x
∗(θ)
A˜
(12)
Ŷt
(
A˜
)
= △t A˜(θ + θ¯)
2
+
[
1−△t] x∗(θ) + A˜θ¯
2
(13)
for all t ≥ 0.
Proposition 4 describes the dynamics of Ωt(θ|A˜t−1) and Ŷt(A˜) over time when the realized
common productivity is constant at A˜ ∈ [0, 1] for all t ≥ 0. The first part of proposition 4 is
straightforward: If A˜ ∈
[
0, x
∗(θ)
θ¯
]
, all entrepreneurs default and are replaced with ones every
period, and if A˜ ∈
[
x∗(θ)
θ
, 1
]
, all entrepreneurs do not default every period.5 In either case,
Ωt
(
θ|A˜t−1
)
= U[θ,θ] for all t ≥ 0, and hence, Ŷt(A˜) = A˜(θ+θ¯)2 . When A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
, on
the other hand, a certain fraction of new entrepreneurs leave the economy after default and
are replaced with new entrepreneurs changing the cdf Ωt
(
θ|A˜t−1
)
and, hence Ŷt(A˜), over
time as stated in (12) and (13), respectively.
Note that Ωt(θ|A˜t−1) in (12) improves over time in the sense of first-order-stochastic
dominance because ∆ < 1 and θ−θ
θ¯−θ <
θ−x∗(θ)
A˜
θ¯−x∗(θ)
A˜
for all θ ∈ [θ¯, θ] when A˜ ∈ (x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
.
As a consequence, Ŷt(A˜) increases over time converging to its limit
x∗(θ)+A˜θ¯
2
. The intuitive
explanation for these findings is as follows. All new entrepreneurs offer x∗(θ) to lenders when
5When A˜ = x
∗(θ)
θ¯
, θ¯ type entrepreneurs do not default and survive to the next period. However, the
measure of survived θ¯ type entrepreneurs is zero every period, so they do not affect the cdf Ωt.
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they are born. Among them, 1−∆ fraction of entrepreneurs with θ ≥ x∗(θ)
A˜
make repayment
x∗(θ), and offer x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
to lenders for all succeeding periods staying in the economy.6 On
the other hand, ∆ fraction of new entrepreneurs with θ < x
∗(θ)
A˜
leave the economy after
default, and they are replaced with new entrepreneurs who go through the same process.
In summary, only entrepreneurs with θ ≥ x∗(θ)
A˜
survive in each period and the process of
survival of the fittest continues until θ of all entrepreneurs is distributed over
[
x∗(θ)
A˜
, θ
]
.
Asymmetric effects of shocks We now study the dynamics of the aggregate production
after a temporary shock on the common productivity when the economy stays in the sta-
tionary e∗ equilibrium. By stationarity, we mean that the cdf Ωt does not change over time.
For example, if A˜ ∈
[
0, x
∗(θ)
θ¯
]
∪
[
x∗(θ)
θ
, 1
]
, the economy stays in a stationary equilibrium
because Ωt
(
θ|A˜t−1
)
= U[θ,θ] for all t ≥ 0. When A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
, Ωt
(
θ|A˜t−1
)
changes
over time, but for a sufficiently high s > 0, we have Ωt
(
θ|A˜t−1
)
≈ Ωt+1
(
θ|A˜t
)
for all
t ≥ s. In this case, we also say that the economy is in a stationary equilibrium, and let
Ωt
(
θ|A˜t−1
)
= Ωt+1
(
θ|A˜t
)
for all t ≥ s without loss of generality.
Consider the sequence A˜′ = {Aτ}∞τ=−1 such that
Aτ = A˜ for all τ 6= s and As = A′ (14)
Suppose that the economy has reached to a stationary equilibrium in period s′ < s, i.e.,
Ωt
(
θ|A˜t−1
)
= Ωt+1
(
θ|A˜t
)
for t ∈ {s′, . . . s−1}. It is obvious that the aggregate production
in period t = s when the shock arrives is given as Ŷs
(
A˜′
)
= A
′
A˜
Ŷs−1
(
A˜′
)
. The question is
how the dynamics of Ŷt
(
A˜′
)
is for t > s after the shock. The results depend on whether a
shock is positive, i.e., A′ > A˜ or negative, i.e., A′ < A˜.
If the shock is positive, i.e., A′ > A˜, then the return on each entrepreneur’s business
operation is higher in period t = s than that of previous periods due to an increase in the
6Note that x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
< x∗(θ) when At = A˜ for all t ≥ 0, and hence entrepreneurs with θ ≥ x
∗(θ)
A˜
can
honor the contract x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
.
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common productivity. No entrepreneur defaults at t = s, and hence, Ωs−1 = Ωs. Given,
At = A˜ for t ≥ s + 1, the aggregate output produced by entrepreneurs is reversed to the
previous level, Ŷs−1
(
A˜′
)
. Thus, the effects of a positive shock A′ > A˜ have temporary effects
on the economy. This is formally stated in the next proposition, whose proof is omitted.
Proposition 5 Take the sequence A˜′ given by (14) for some A˜ ∈ (0, 1], and assume that
the economy has reached to the stationary e∗ equilibrium in period s′ < s. If A′ > A˜, then
Ŷt
(
A˜′
)
= Ŷs−1
(
A˜′
)
for all t ≥ s+ 1.
If the shock is negative, i.e., A′ < A˜, on the other hand, the shock could lead a certain
type of entrepreneurs to default, which changes the composition of entrepreneurs in the
economy. Thus, a negative shock can have persistent effects on Ŷt(A˜
′) for t ≥ s + 1. The
specific dynamics of Ŷt(A˜
′) after the shock depends on the level of A˜ and A′ as described in
the next proposition.
Proposition 6 Take the sequence A˜′ given by (14) for some A˜ ∈ (0, 1] with A′ < A˜, and
assume that the economy has reached to the stationary e∗ equilibrium in period s′ < s. Let
θ˜ = x
∗(θ)
A˜
, ∆ =
x∗(θ)
A˜
−θ
θ¯−θ , △′ = min
{
1,
x∗(θ)
A′
−θ
θ¯−θ
}
, and △˜′ = min
{
1,
x∗(θ˜)
A′
−θ˜
θ¯−θ˜
}
. Then, for
t ≥ s+ 1, Ŷt(A˜′) is given as follows:
1. Assume that A˜ ∈
[
x∗(θ)
θ
, 1
]
.
1-a. If A′ ∈
[
x∗(θ)
θ
, A˜
)
, then Ŷt
(
A˜′
)
= A˜(θ+θ¯)
2
.
1-b. If A′ ∈
[
0, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
, then Ŷt
(
A˜′
)
= △′ A˜(θ+θ¯)
2
+ [1−△′] A˜
2
(
x∗(θ)
A′
+ θ¯
)
.
2. Assume that A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
.
2-a. If A′ ∈
[
x∗(θ˜)
θ˜
, A˜
)
, then Ŷt
(
A˜′
)
=
A˜(θ˜+θ¯)
2
.
2-b. If A′ ∈
[
0, x
∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
, then Ŷt
(
A˜′
)
= △˜′
{
△t−(s+1) A˜(θ+θ¯)
2
+
[
1−△t−(s+1)] x∗(θ)+A˜θ¯
2
}
+[
1− △˜′
]
A˜
2
(
x∗(θ˜)
A′
+ θ¯
)
3. Assume that A˜ ∈
(
0, x
∗(θ)
θ¯
]
, then Ŷt
(
A˜′
)
= A˜(θ+θ¯)
2
.
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The central implication of proposition 6 is that the dynamics of Ŷt(A˜
′) depends on the
measure of defaulted entrepreneurs when the negative shock arrives at t = s. First, if A′
is not too low as in the cases of 1-a and 2-a in proposition 6, all existing entrepreneurs
survive without defaulting in period t = s. This implies that Ωt = Ωs−1, and hence Yt(A˜′) =
Ys−1(A˜′), for all t ≥ s + 1. Second, if A′ is low enough, a certain fraction (△′ and △˜′ for
the cases 1-b and 2-b, respectively) of existing entrepreneurs default in period t = s and are
replaced with new entrepreneurs. Thus, Yt(A˜
′) for t ≥ s+ 1 consists of two parts: 1) goods
produced by entrepreneurs who were born after the negative shock and 2) goods produced
by the existing entrepreneurs who did not default in the period when the shock arrived. In
particular, if A′ is sufficiently low, including case 3 where all entrepreneures default in every
period, then all existing entrepreneurs leave the economy, and the economy starts with all
new entrepreneurs in period s+ 1.
Note, from proposition 6, that when A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
, the time it takes for the aggregate
production to recover back to the pre-shock level after a negative shock depends on the size
of shock, measured by A˜−A
′
A˜
. Specifically, when A′ is not too low as A′ ∈
[
x∗(θ˜)
θ˜
, A˜
)
, no
entrepreneurs default in period s and the aggregate production Ŷt
(
A˜′
)
moves back to the
pre-shock level
A˜(θ˜+θ¯)
2
in the next period after the negative shock, i.e., Ŷs+1
(
A˜′
)
=
A˜(θ˜+θ¯)
2
.
On the other hand, if A′ is sufficiently low as A′ < x
∗(θ)
θ¯
, then all entrepreneurs default when
the shock arrives in period t = s and Ŷt
(
A˜′
)
increases for all t ≥ s+1, converging to A˜(θ˜+θ¯)
2
.
Finally, suppose that A′ ∈
[
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
. Then, from the case 2-b of proposition 6, we obtain
Ŷt
(
A˜′
)
−
A˜
(
θ˜ + θ¯
)
2
= −△˜′△t−(s+1)
[
x∗ (θ)− A˜θ
2
]
+
(
1− △˜′
)x∗
(
θ˜
)
A˜
A′
− x∗ (θ)
2
 (15)
for t ≥ s+1. Substituting ∆ =
x∗(θ)
A˜
−θ
θ¯−θ and △˜′ =
x∗(θ˜)
A′
−θ˜
θ¯−θ˜ into (15) and using the assumptions
that A˜ > x
∗(θ)
θ¯
and A′ < x
∗(θ˜)
θ˜
, we obtain that Ŷt
(
A˜′
)
≥ A˜(θ˜+θ¯)
2
for all t ≥ t̂
(
A˜, A′
)
+ s+ 1,
Figure 1: Dynamics of Ŷt
(
A˜′
)
when A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
where
t̂
(
A˜, A′
)
≡
log
(
θ˜ − θ
)
− log
(
θ¯ − x∗(θ˜)
A′
)
log
(
θ¯ − θ)− log (x∗(θ)
A˜
− θ
) . (16)
Note that t̂
(
A˜, A′
)
in (16) decreases with A′, and hence it takes more time for the aggregate
production to move back to the pre-shock level as A′ decreases. The analysis of the above
three cases shows that the time for recovery of aggregate production increases as the size of
the shock increases. Figure 1 summarizes the above analysis.
Although we have focused on the effects of a common productivity shock in a station-
ary equilibrium, the results that a positive shock does not change the composition of en-
trepreneurs while a negative shock can change the distribution of entrepreneurial productivity
also hold in a non-stationary equilibrium. Thus, given a sequence of {At}∞t=0 ∈ A, where At
is independently distributed over time, the pattern of the dynamics of the aggregate output
is similar to the results in propositions 5 and 6, although the aggregate output fluctuates in
response to changes in At over time. In particular, the model generates the cyclical asym-
metry in which the economy behaves differently over the expansion and recession phases of
the business cycle.7 Specifically, in the model economy, the pace of increases in the output
7Because Ŷt
(
A˜
)
increases over time only if A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
,
x∗(θ)
θ
)
, the cyclical asymmetry of the aggre-
gate production, Ŷt(A), in a non-stationary equilibrium becomes more apparent as the realized common
productivities, {At}∞t=0, are concentrated in the range of At ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
,
x∗(θ)
θ
)
.
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is slower than the pace of declines on average, consistent with empirical findings.8
A number of studies have attempted to provide explanations for the cyclical asymmetry of
aggregate time-series data. For example, Acemoglu and Scott (1997) show that intertemporal
increasing return can generate a persistent output fluctuation over the expansion phases, and
Chalkley and Lee (1998) derive similar results using risk-averse agents and noisy information
on the aggregate state. In the context of our modeled economy, the cyclical asymmetry of
the business cycle and the slow recovery of output back to the pre-crisis level after a big
shock is symptomatic of the improvement of entrepreneurial productivity over time through
the continuous replacement of less productive entrepreneurs with new ones, complementing
previous studies. In particular, once we interpret the total factor productivity as the product
of common productivity and the average of entrepreneurial productivity, our model provides
better insights on the recent empirical findings that protracted drop in productivity is an
essential factor of the slow recovery after a crisis (see Reifschneider et al. (2015) and Ikeda
and Kurozumi (2019)).
Constructive economic downturn One interesting result in proposition 6 is that while
the aggregate production drops when the negative shock arrives, the aggregate production
can exceed the pre-shock level after the shock unless all existing entrepreneurs leave the
economy or survive. Specifically, when A˜ ∈
[
x∗(θ)
θ
, 1
]
, if A′ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
, we obtain
Ŷt
(
A˜′
)
= △′ A˜(θ + θ¯)
2
+ [1−△′] A˜
2
(
x∗(θ)
A′
+ θ¯
)
>
A˜(θ + θ¯)
2
= Ŷs−1
(
A˜′
)
for all t ≥ s + 1. Similarly, when A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
, if A′ ∈
(
x∗(θ˜)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
, then Ŷt
(
A˜′
)
≥
Ŷs−1
(
A˜′
)
for all t ≥ t̂
(
A˜, A′
)
+ s + 1, where t̂
(
A˜, A′
)
is given in (16). This is because
when the negative shock arrives, only entrepreneurs with productivities that are higher than
8See Neftc¸i (1984), Hamilton (1989), and Morley and Piger (2012) for empirical studies.
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a certain level survive, and they stay in the economy for all succeeding periods, thereby
improving the average entrepreneurial productivity.
Therefore, although a negative shock reduces the total production when the shock ar-
rives, it can raise the aggregate production in the long term. The question is whether a
negative shock is beneficial. To conduct a cost-benefit analysis of a negative shock on the
common productivity, we use the sum of discounted aggregate productions as our criterion
for the constructiveness of a negative shock. Specifically, we compare
∑∞
t=0 β
tŶt
(
A˜
)
and∑∞
t=0 β
tŶt
(
A˜′
)
for two sequences A˜ and A˜′, where A˜′ given by (14) for some A˜ ∈ (0, 1] with
A′ < A˜. Note that Ŷt
(
A˜
)
= Ŷt
(
A˜′
)
for all t < s. Given A˜ and β, define the set of A′ as
I
(
A˜, β
)
=
{
A′ < A˜ :
∞∑
t=s
βt[Ŷt(A
′)− Ŷt(A˜)] > 0
}
.
Then, for all A′ ∈ I
(
A˜, β
)
, the negative shock is constructive and the shock is destructive
otherwise.
Proposition 7 Take the sequence A˜′ given by (14) for some A˜ ∈ (0, 1] with A′ < A˜. If β is
sufficiently high, there exists A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, 1
]
such that I
(
A˜, β
)
is an open interval with the
following properties:
1. If A˜ ∈
[
x∗(θ)
θ
, 1
]
, then I
(
A˜, β
)
⊂
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
, and for any A˜1, A˜2 ∈
[
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, 1
]
with
A˜1 < A˜2, I
(
A˜2, β
)
⊂ I
(
A˜1, β
)
.
2. If A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
, then I
(
A˜, β
)
⊂
(
x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
θ¯
,
x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
.
Proposition 7 shows that the constructiveness of the negative shock depends on three
factors. First, for the negative shock to be constructive, the shock should remove less pro-
ductive entrepreneurs and improve the long term average entrepreneurial productivity. Thus,
the constructive economic downturn occurs only for A′ in the subset of
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
or of(
x∗(θ˜)
θ¯
,
x∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
, depending on A˜.9 Second, it takes time for the negative shock to raise the ag-
9Proposition 6 shows that 1) when A˜ ∈
[
x∗(θ)
θ
, 1
]
, the measure of defaulting entrepreneurs △′ is in (0, 1)
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gregate production in the long run, and hence, it is more likely that the shock is constructive
with the higher discount factor β. Third, A˜ matters, because the cdf Ωt before the shock and
the size of shock, A˜−A
′
A˜
, depend on A˜. Specifically, when A˜ ∈
[
x∗(θ¯)
θ¯
, 1
]
, a decrease in A˜ only
alleviates the temporary negative effect of the shock without changing Ωt in a steady state,
and the measure of I
(
A˜, β
)
decreases with A˜. Similarly, when A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
, a decrease
in A˜ alleviates the temporary negative effect of the shock, expanding the set I
(
A˜, β
)
. How-
ever, in this case, θ is uniformly distributed over
[
x∗(θ)
A˜
, θ
]
in a steady state. Thus, as A˜
decreases, the average productivity of existing entrepreneur before the shock increases, and
hence, the positive effects of the negative shock on the long run aggregate ouput decreases,
contracting the set I
(
A˜, β
)
. Combined together, the effects of A˜ on I
(
A˜, β
)
is unclear.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have constructed a dynamic equilibrium model of debt contracts with
adverse selection and studied how lenders’ beliefs about borrowers with different business
operation histories are constructed using the information on aggregate economic conditions
in the past. We have shown that the credit risk of a borrower perceived by lenders weakly
decreases as the borrower gets older, because more productive borrowers tend to stay in the
economy for longer periods. In equilibrium, the borrowing cost weakly decreases through-
out borrower’s life, and old borrowers pay lower borrowing costs than young borrowers on
average. We have shown that the model was tractable for analytically analyzing impulse
responses after an aggregate productivity shock. We used the model to provide theoretical
explanations for the cyclical asymmetry of aggregate output over the business cycle and a
narrative for the sluggish recovery of economic activities after a crisis. The model also shows
that a mild negative productivity shock can be constructive, increasing aggregate output in
for A′ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
,
x∗(θ)
θ
)
, and 2) when A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
,
x∗(θ)
θ
)
, the measure of defaulting entrepreneurs △˜′ is in
(0, 1) for A′ ∈
(
x∗(θ˜)
θ¯
,
x∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
.
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the long run.
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Appendix A: Proof
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is done by showing that 0 <
b(θ)−
√
b(θ)2−4b(θ)r
θ
< 1. First,
b(θ)−
√
b(θ)2−4b(θ)r
θ
> 0 is well-defined because b(θ) =
[
1
θ¯−θ
∫ θ¯
θ
1
θ
dθ
]−1
>
[
1
θ¯−θ
∫ θ¯
θ
1
θ
· dθ
]−1
=
θ ≥ 4r. Because b(θ)
θ
−
√(
b(θ)
θ
)2
− 4r
θ
b(θ)
θ
strictly decreases in b(θ)
θ
and 1 < b(θ)
θ
, b(θ)
θ
−√(
b(θ)
θ
)2
− 4r
θ
· b(θ)
θ
< 1−
√
1− 4r
θ
≤ 1, which finishes the proof.
Proof of lemma 2. Consider any entrepreneur θ with (ot−1,At−1) ∈ O × A in period
t ≥ 0. Take any xit ∈ B∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1) for i = 1, 2, where x1t < x2t . Let Dit be the
corresponding optimal default set for xit for each i = 1, 2. Because At ∈ Dit if and only
if either xit > βVt+1(θ,ot−1 ∪ {1},At−1 ∪ {At}) or xit > Atθ for each i = 1, 2, it must be
D1t ⊆ D2t . Furthermore, because x2t ∈ B∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1), the lender’s expected payoff from
accepting x2t is no less than r, which requires that [0, 1] \D2t has a positive measure. Thus
v(θ,ot−1,At−1, x1t , D
1
t )− v(θ,ot−1,At−1, x2t , D2t )
=
∫
[0,1]\D1t
[−x1t + βVt+1(θ,ot,At)] dU(At)− ∫
[0,1]\D2t
[−x2t + βVt+1(θ,ot,At)] dU(At)
≥
∫
[0,1]\D2t
[−x1t + βVt+1(θ,ot,At)] dU(At)− ∫
[0,1]\D2t
[−x2t + βVt+1(θ,ot,At)] dU(At)
=
∫
[0,1]\D2t
(x2t − x1t )dU(At) > 0,
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where ot = ot−1 ∪ {1} and At = At−1 ∪ {At}. Thus, the type (θ,ot−1) entrepreneur strictly
prefers x1t to x
2
t . This implies that whenever the entrepreneur makes an acceptable offer from
B∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1), he/she chooses min {B∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1)} independent of the productivity θ.
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove proposition 1, we first start with proving the following
lemma and claim, which provides useful intermediate steps.
Lemma 4
∂b(θ)
∂θ
> 0 and ∂x
∗(θ)
∂θ
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. From assumption 1, we obtain ∂b(θ)
∂θ
=
θ¯
θ
−1−ln( θ¯
θ
)
(ln θ¯−ln θ)2 > 0 for all θ <
θ¯ and ∂b(θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣
θ=θ¯
= lim
θ→θ¯
b(θ¯)−b(θ)
θ¯−θ = limθ→θ¯
∂b(θ)
∂θ
= 1
2
> 0. Thus, ∂x
∗(θ)
∂θ
= ∂x
∗(θ)
∂b(θ)
∂b(θ)
∂θ
=
1
2
{
1− b(θ)−2r√
b(θ)2−4b(θ)r
}
∂b(θ)
∂θ
< 0 because b(θ)−2r√
b(θ)2−4b(θ)r > 1.
Consider the profile of strategies 〈{xt, Dt} ,Bt〉∞t=0 that satisfies the following conditions:
For any (o′t−1,At−1) ∈ O∗×A, if Γ̂t(o′t−1,At−1) = U[θ̂,θ] for some θ̂ ∈ Θ, then for all θ ∈ [θ̂, θ],
a type (θ,o′t−1) entrepreneur offers xt(θ,o
′
t−1,At−1) =
b(θ̂)−
√
b(θ̂)2−4b(θ̂)r
2
= x∗(θ̂), where x∗(·) is
defined in (6), and chooses the default set as Dt(θ,ot−1,At−1, x∗(θ̂)) =
[
0, x
∗(θ̂)
θ
)
, and lenders
accept this contract, x∗(θ̂), offered by an entrepreneur with o′t−1. We call the entrepreneur’s
and lender’s strategies that satisfy the above conditions “S∗e -strategy” and “S
∗
l -strategy”,
respectively.10
Claim 1 Suppose that all alive entrepreneurs adopt the S∗e -strategy and lenders adopt the
S∗l -strategy, and let oτ−1 and Aτ−1 be the truncated subsequences of ot−1 and At−1, such
that oh and Ah are removed for all h > τ for any (ot−1,At−1) ∈ O∗ × A. Then, for all
t ≥ 0 and for all i ∈ IE = [0, 1], Ot−1(i) ∈ O∗. Also, for all (ot−1,At−1) ∈ O∗ × A,
if supp
(
Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1)
)
6= ∅, then Γ̂τ (oτ−1,Aτ−1) = U[θ̂τ ,θ] for each τ = s, . . . t, where
10Note that the S∗e and S
∗
l strategies do not specify any rules for (o
′
t−1,At−1) ∈ O∗×A if Γ̂t(o′t−1,At−1) is
not in the form of U[θ̂,θ] for some θ̂ ∈ Θ. Also, under the S∗e -strategy, an entrepreneur with o′′t−1 ∈ O\O∗ can
choose any x ∈ X. Furthermore, without specification about the lender’s belief system, there is no reason
for the S∗e to be the best response to S
∗
l , vice versa.
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s ∈ {0, . . . t} is the birthdate of the ot−1-group entrepreneurs and θ̂τ is given as
θ̂τ = θ if τ = s and θ̂τ = max
{
x∗(θ̂τ−1)
Aτ−1
, θ̂τ−1
}
for τ = s+ 1, . . . , t. (17)
Proof of claim 1. At t = 0, the statement holds because O−1(i) = {∅} ∈ O∗ for all i ∈ IE
and Γ̂0(o−1,A−1) = U[θ,θ¯]. To prove the claim by induction, assume that the statement holds
for t = k, namely, 1) for any i ∈ IE, Ok−1(i) ∈ O∗ and 2) for any (o′k−1,Ak−1) ∈ O∗k−1×Ak−1,
if supp
(
Γ̂k(o
′
k−1,Ak−1)
)
6= ∅, then Γ̂k(o′k−1,Ak−1) = U[θ̂k,θ] where θ̂k is derived as follows:
letting s be the birthdate of o′k−1-group entrepreneurs, θ̂s = θ and θ̂τ = max
{
x∗(θ̂τ−1)
Aτ−1
, θ̂τ−1
}
for τ = s+ 1, . . . , k. Under S∗e -strategy, all entrepreneurs in the o
′
k−1-group offer a contract
x∗(θ̂k) and default if and only if Akθ < x∗(θ̂k) at period k. Thus, any survived entrepreneurs
in the o′k−1-group will start the next period k + 1 with the operation history o
′
k = o
′
k−1 ∪
{1} ∈ O∗ and Γ̂k+1(o′k ∪ {1},Ak−1 ∪ {Ak}) = U[θ̂k+1,θ¯], where θ̂k+1 = max
{
θ̂k,
x∗(θ̂k)
Ak
}
unless
x∗(θ̂k)
Ak
> θ, i.e., all o′k−1-group entrepreneurs defaults in period k+1. Furthermore, all newly
born entrepreneurs in period k + 1 start the operation history o′′k = {∅, . . .∅} ∈ O∗, which
implies Γ̂k+1(o
′′
k,Ak−1 ∪ {Ak}) = U[θ,θ¯]. As a result Ok(i) ∈ O∗ for all i ∈ IE and for any
(ok,Ak) ∈ O∗k × Ak, if supp
(
Γ̂k+1(ok,Ak)
)
6= ∅, then Γ̂k+1(ok,Ak) = U[θ̂k+1,θ] for some
θ̂k+1 ∈ [θ, θ¯], where θ̂k+1 is given recursively by (17). Thus, the statement also holds for
t = k + 1, which finishes the proof of claim 1.
Claim 1 says that if all alive entrepreneurs adopt the S∗e -strategy and lenders adopt the
S∗l -strategy in an equilibrium then it is a full production equilibrium where all the three
statements of proposition 1 are satisfied.
Now we show that in any full production equilibrium, for any period t and (ot−1,At−1) ∈
O × A, if Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1) = U[θ̂,θ¯] for some θ̂ ∈ Θ then x∗(θ̂) ≤ minB∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1) for any
consistent Φ. By lemma 2, all the entrepreneurs in Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1) offer the same contract
x = minB∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1) so that Φ(x,ot−1,At−1) = Γ̂(ot−1,At−1) = U[θ̂,θ¯] must hold for Φ
to be consistent. Note, from (8), that, given the term of the contract x, lender’s expected
37
payoff who accepts x is maximized when every entrepreneur θ ∈ supp
(
Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1)
)
sets
the minimum default set, i.e., Dt =
[
0, x
θ
)
. That is,
max
{Dθ}θ∈[θ̂,θ¯]:[0,xθ )⊆Dθ∀θ
∫
[θ̂,θ¯]
∫
[0,1]\Dθ
xdU(At)dU[θ̂,θ¯](θ) =
∫
[θ̂,θ¯]
∫
[x
θ
,1]
xdU(At)dU[θ̂,θ¯](θ) = x−
x2
b(θ̂)
.
Since x∗(θ̂) = min{x : x − x2
b(θ̂)
≥ r}, the lender will never take any offer lower than
x∗(θ̂), hence, x ≥ x∗(θ̂). Additionally, if the minimum default set is chosen by every en-
trepreneur θ ∈ supp
(
Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1)
)
with the term of the contract x∗(θ̂), then x∗(θ̂) =
minB∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1). That is, when all alive entrepreneurs adopt the S∗e -strategy then it
is rational for lenders to adopt the S∗l -strategy. Furthermore, if there is a full production
equilibrium that satisfies all the statements in proposition 1, then it is e∗.
We finish the proof by showing the existence of such full production equilibrium. Ac-
cording to claim 1, it suffices to show that there exists a full production equilibrium in
which all alive entrepreneurs adopt the S∗e -strategy and lenders adopt the S
∗
l -strategy. For
all t ≥ 0 and (ot−1,At−1) ∈ O∗t−1×At−1, we define a function θ̂ : O∗t−1×At−1 → Θ such that
θ̂(ot−1,At−1) is constructed by the rule (17) described in claim 1. Then, construct a belief
system Φ such that
Φ(x,ot−1,At−1) =

U[θ̂(ot−1,At−1),θ]
U[
θ,
θ+θ¯
2
]
if ot−1 ∈ O∗
if ot−1 /∈ O∗
(18)
for every x ∈ X.11 Note that if all alive entrepreneurs adopt the S∗e -strategy and lenders
adopt the S∗l -strategy, Φ is consistent by the results of claim 1. Also, as explained in the
previous paragraph, the S∗l -strategy is the best response of lenders to the S
∗
e -strategy given
the belief system Φ by (18). To complete the proof, we show the S∗e -strategy is the best
response to the S∗l -strategy. In the followings, we assume that lenders adopt the S
∗
l -strategy.
Take any period t and (ot−1,At−1) ∈ O∗t−1 × At−1. Suppose that a type (θ,ot−1) en-
11Note that the belief system (18) is one example and there exist an infinite number of belief systems that
support e∗ equilibrium described in proposition 1.
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trepreneur offers x∗(θ̂(ot−1,At−1)). We first show that the minimum default set is the opti-
mal default strategy after proposing x∗(θ̂(ot−1,At−1)). By claim 1 and the construction of
Φ in (18), B∗t+1(Φ,ot−1∪{1},At−1∪{At}) 6= ∅ because any survived entrepreneurs can offer
x∗(θ̂(ot−1∪{1},At−1∪{At})). Then, Vt+1(θ,ot−1∪{1},At−1∪{At}) ≥
∫
[0,1]
AtθdU(At) =
θ
2
because an entrepreneur can always choose to offer an acceptable contract and default
on the contract. Furthermore, by assumption 1 and lemma 4, for each θ ∈ Θ, x∗(θ) ≤
x∗(θ) < βθ
2
≤ βθ
2
. As a result, βVt+1(θ,ot−1 ∪ {1},At−1 ∪ {At}) > x∗(θ̂(ot−1,At−1)) for all
At ≥ x
∗(θ̂(ot−1,At−1))
θ
, which implies the optimal default strategy is the minimum default set,
i.e., Dt =
[
0, x
∗(θ̂(ot−1,At−1))
θ
)
.
We now show that it is optimal for a type (θ,ot−1) entrepreneur to offer x∗(θ̂(ot−1,At−1)).
By lemma 2, either xt(θ,ot−1,At−1) = x∗(θ̂(ot−1,At−1)) or xt(θ,ot−1,At−1) = ∅. So it
sufficies to show that the type (θ,ot−1) entrepreneur has no incentive to offer ∅ in the current
period t. By the construction of Φ, for any periods t′, t′′ and (x′,o′t′ ,A
′
t′), (x
′′,o′′t′′ ,A
′′
t′′) ∈
X×O\O∗×A, Φ(x′,o′t′ ,A′t′) = Φ(x′′,o′′t′′ ,A′′t′′) so that B∗t′(Φ,o′t′ ,A′t′) = B∗t′′(Φ,o′′t′′ ,A′′t′′) ≡ B′.
Suppose that B′ = ∅. If an entrepreneur with ot−1 ∈ O∗ does not make an offer in a given
period t ≥ 0, i.e., x = ∅, then his/her operation histories in the future belong to O\O∗.
Thus, the entrepreneur cannot make an acceptable offer to lenders for all succeeding periods,
so the continuation value from not making an offer is zero. On the other hand, offering an
acceptable contract gives a positive continuation value. Thus, if B′ = ∅, the entrepreneur
has no incentive to offer x = ∅.
Now suppose that B′ 6= ∅. Then, x′ ≡ minB′ < minB∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1) = x∗(θ̂) because
U[
θ,
θ+θ¯
2
] is first order stochastically dominated by U[θ̂(ot−1,At−1),θ¯]. Suppose conversely that it
is optimal for a type (θ,ot−1) entrepreneur to offer x = ∅, i.e., not making an otter, for a
finite periods12 from period t and offer a contract at period t + τ . Then θ has to endure a
high contract x′ in period t+ τ on top of an additional discounting of βτ , so that, according
to the proof of lemma 2, it is strictly dominated by offering x∗(θ̂(ot−1,At−1)) in the current
12Offering ∅ forever results in zero payoff, which is obviously an inferior choice.
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period.
Proof of lemma 3. Since λ(θ) = x
∗(θ)
b(θ)
= 1
2
−
√
1
4
− r
b(θ)
, ∂λ(θ)
∂b(θ)
= ∂
∂b(θ)
(
1−
√
1− 4r
b(θ)
)
< 0.
Since ∂b(θ)
∂θ
> 0 by the results of lemma 4, ∂λ(θ)
∂θ
= ∂λ(θ)
∂b(θ)
· ∂b(θ)
∂θ
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider any period t and (ot−1,At−1) ∈ Ot−1 × At−1 in e∗.
Then, by proposition 1 and letting s ≥ 0 be the birthdate of ot−1-group entrepreneurs,
Γ̂τ (oτ−1,Aτ−1) = U[θ̂τ ,θ] with θ̂s = θ and θ̂τ = max
{
x∗(θ̂τ−1)
Aτ−1
, θ̂τ−1
}
≥ θ̂τ−1 for each τ =
s + 1, . . . t. Thus θ̂τ weakly increases over time. Becase both the repayment on the credit
contract x∗(θ) and the credit risk λ(θ) decrease in θ by lemmas 3 and 4, x∗(θ) and λ(θ)
weakly decrease over time.
Proof of proposition 3. Take any oot−1,o
y
t−1 ∈ O∗t−1 in the full production equilibrium.
By proposition 1 there exist θ1, θ2 such that Γ̂t(o
o
t−1,At−1) = U[θ1,θ¯] and Γ̂t(o
y
t−1,At−1) =
U[θ2,θ¯]. Assume that θ1 > θ2 and let θ
′
1(At) = min supp
(
Γ̂t+1(o
o
t−1 ∪ {1},At−1 ∪ {At})
)
and
θ′2(At) = min supp
(
Γ̂t+1(o
y
t−1 ∪ {1},At−1 ∪ {At})
)
for each At ∈ [0, 1]. We study the sign
of the conditional expectation of θ′1(At) − θ′2(At) over At’s given that there are survivers
who proceed to period t+1 in both groups, i.e., supp
(
Γ̂t(o
i
t−1 ∪ {1},At−1 ∪ {At})
)
6= ∅ for
each i ∈ {o, y}. By proposition 1, each entrepreneur θ ∈ Γ̂(oit−1,At−1) for each i ∈ {o, y}
at period t plays
(
x∗(θi),
[
0, x
∗(θi)
θ
))
. Thus, supp
(
Γ̂t(o
i
t−1 ∪ {1},At−1 ∪ {At})
)
6= ∅ for
both i ∈ {o, y} if and only if At ≥ x
∗(θ2)
θ¯
given the assumption that θ1 > θ2. We know
from proposition 1 that θ′1(At) = max
{
x∗(θ1)
At
, θ1
}
and θ′2(At) = max
{
x∗(θ2)
At
, θ2
}
. Notice
that θ′1(At) =
x∗(θ1)
At
when At ∈
[
x∗(θ2)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ1)
θ1
]
and θ′1(At) = θ1 when At ∈
[
x∗(θ1)
θ1
, 1
]
, while
θ′2(At) =
x∗(θ2)
At
when At ∈
[
x∗(θ2)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ2)
θ2
]
and θ′2(At) = θ2 when At ∈
[
x∗(θ2)
θ2
, 1
]
. Moreover
it is uncertain whether
[
x∗(θ2)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ1)
θ1
]
= ∅. Let θ∗ be such that x
∗(θ2)
θ¯
= x
∗(θ∗)
θ∗
, that is,
x∗(θ∗)
θ∗
θ¯
x∗(θ2)
= 1. Since x
∗(θ)
θ
θ¯
x∗(θ2)
strictly decreases in θ and x
∗(θ2)
θ2
θ¯
x∗(θ2)
= θ¯
θ2
> 1, θ∗ > θ2.
Moreover,
[
x∗(θ2)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ1)
θ1
]
6= ∅ whenever θ1 ≤ θ∗.
40
First, suppose that x
∗(θ2)
θ¯
≤ x∗(θ1)
θ1
. Then, we obtain
(
1− x
∗(θ2)
θ¯
)
EAt
[
θ′1(At)− θ′2(At) | At ≥
x∗(θ2)
θ¯
]
=
∫ x∗(θ1)
θ1
x∗(θ2)
θ¯
x∗(θ1)
At
dAt + θ1
(
1− x
∗(θ1)
θ1
)
−
∫ x∗(θ2)
θ2
x∗(θ2)
θ¯
x∗(θ2)
At
dAt − θ2
(
1− x
∗(θ2)
θ2
)
= (θ1 − θ2) + (x∗(θ2)− x∗(θ1)) + x∗(θ1) ln
(
x∗(θ1)
θ1
θ¯
x∗(θ2)
)
− x∗(θ2) ln θ¯
θ2
.
Denoting x′(θ) = ∂x
∗(θ)
∂θ
and x′′(θ) = ∂
2x∗(θ)
∂θ2
, we have x′(θ) < 0 and ∂b(θ)
∂θ
> 0 by lemma
4. From the definition of b(·) in assumption 1, we obtain b(θ) = θ¯θ−1
log θ¯
θ
. Letting u =
θ¯
θ
≥ 1 for each θ ∈ Θ, we obtain ∂2b(θ)
∂θ2
=
[(
1 + 1
u
)
log u− 2 (1− 1
u
)] · (− θ̂
θ2(log u)3
)
<
0 since
(
1 + 1
u
)
log u − 2 (1− 1
u
)
increases in u and
(
1 + 1
u
)
ln u − 2 (1− 1
u
)
= 0 when
u = 1. Also x′′(θ) = 1
2
(
1− b(θ)−2r√
b(θ)2−4b(θ)r
)
∂2b(θ)
∂θ2
+ 2r2 (b(θ)2 − 4b(θ))− 32
(
∂b(θ)
∂θ
)2
> 0 from
1− b(θ)−2r√
b(θ)2−4b(θ)r < 0,
∂2b(θ)
∂θ2
< 0, and b(θ)2 − 4b(θ) > 0.
Now, for each θ ∈ [θ2, θ∗], define a function of θ as
F (θ) = (θ − θ2) + (x∗(θ2)− x∗(θ)) + x∗(θ) ln
(
x∗(θ)
θ
θ¯
x∗(θ2)
)
− x∗(θ2) ln θ¯
θ2
. (19)
Then, F (θ1) =
(
1− x∗(θ2)
θ¯
)
EAt
[
θ′1(At)− θ′2(At) | At ≥ x
∗(θ2)
θ¯
]
, so it suffices to show F (θ1) >
0. Evaluating F ′(θ) at θ = θ2, we obtain F ′(θ2) = 1+ x′(θ2) ln
(
θ¯
θ2
)
− x∗(θ2)
θ2
. Using the facts
that ∂
∂θ2
[
x′(θ2) log
(
θ¯
θ2
)]
> 0 and ∂
∂θ2
[
x∗(θ2)
θ2
]
< 0, we obtain
F ′(θ2) ≥ 1 + x′(θ) ln
(
θ¯
θ
)
− x
∗(θ)
θ
= 1− 1
2θ
G(b),
where G(b) =
(
b−2r√
b2−4rb − 1
)
(b− θ) + b − √b2 − 4rb for each b > 4r and b = b(θ) = θ¯−θ
ln( θ¯
θ
)
.
Note that G′(b) < 0 for all b > 4r. Then, F ′(θ2) ≥ 1 − 12θG(b) > 1 − 12θG(θ) = 1 −
1
2θ
(
θ −
√
θ2 − 4rθ
)
> 0. Next, using the results of lemma 4 and the fact that x
∗(θ)
θ
θ
x∗(θ2)
≥ 1,
it can be verified that F ′′(θ) > 0. Then, F ′(θ1) > F ′(θ2) > 0 and F (θ2) = 0. This implies
F (θ1) > 0, finishing the proof for the case that θ1 ∈ (θ2, θ∗].
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Second, suppose that x
∗(θ2)
θ¯
≥ x∗(θ1)
θ1
. Then,
(
1− x
∗(θ2)
θ¯
)
EAt
[
θ′1 − θ′2 | At ≥
x∗(θ2)
θ¯
]
= θ1
(
1− x
∗(θ2)
θ¯
)
−
∫ x∗(θ2)
θ2
x∗(θ2)
θ¯
x∗(θ2)
At
dAt − θ2
(
1− x
∗(θ2)
θ2
)
= θ1 − θ2 + x∗(θ2)
[
1− θ1
θ¯
− ln θ¯
θ2
]
Notice that θ1 − θ2 + x∗(θ2)
[
1− θ1
θ¯
− ln θ¯
θ2
]
strictly increases in θ1, and θ1 ≥ θ¯x
∗(θ1)
x∗(θ2)
by the
assumption in this case. As we plug in the smallest θ1 in this range, that is,
x∗(θ2)
θ¯
= x
∗(θ1)
θ1
,
(
1− x
∗(θ2)
θ¯
)
EAt
[
θ′1(At)− θ′2(At) | At ≥
x∗(θ2)
θ¯
=
x∗(θ1)
θ1
]
=
∫ x∗(θ1)
θ1
x∗(θ2)
θ¯
x∗(θ1)
At
dAt + θ1
(
1− x
∗(θ1)
θ1
)
−
∫ x∗(θ2)
θ2
x∗(θ2)
θ¯
x∗(θ2)
At
dAt − θ2
(
1− x
∗(θ2)
θ2
)
.
Since EAt
[
θ′1(At)− θ′2(At) | At ≥ x
∗(θ2)
θ¯
]
> 0 given x
∗(θ2)
θ¯
≤ x∗(θ1)
θ1
, it is also true when x
∗(θ2)
θ¯
>
x∗(θ1)
θ1
.
Proof of proposition 4. First consider the case A˜ ∈
[
0, x
∗(θ)
θ¯
]
∪
[
x∗(θ)
θ
, 1
]
. Suppose that
Ωt = U[θ,θ¯] in a given period t ≥ 0. According to proposition 1, the θ entrepreneur at period t
plays
(
x∗(θ),
[
0, x
∗(θ)
θ
))
. If A˜ ∈
[
0, x
∗(θ)
θ¯
)
, then all the entrepreneurs default in the afternoon
of period t. On the other hand, if A˜ ∈
[
x∗(θ)
θ
, 1
]
, every entrepreneur survives. In either case,
Ωt+1 = U[θ,θ¯]. If A˜ =
x∗(θ)
θ¯
then θ survives if and only if θ = θ¯ so that the mass of the defaulted
entrepreneurs at period 0 is 1, that is, Ωt+1 = U[θ,θ¯]. Thus, for any A˜ ∈
[
0, x
∗(θ)
θ¯
]
∪
[
x∗(θ)
θ
, 1
]
,
Ωt = U[θ,θ¯] implies Ωt+1 = Ωt. Since Ω0 = U[θ,θ¯], Ωt = U[θ,θ¯] for all t ≥ 0. Therefore the
aggregate production at each period t is given as Ŷt
(
A˜
)
=
∫
[θ,θ¯]
A˜θdU[θ,θ¯] =
1
2
A˜(θ¯ + θ).
Now consider that A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
. Consider a group of entrepreneurs with mass of
M ∈ (0, 1] and the type distribution U[θ,θ¯] in a given period t ≥ 0. According to proposition
1, all entrepreneurs offer x∗(θ), and entrepreneurs with θ < x
∗(θ)
A˜
default in period t. Thus,
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the survivers from this group are of mass
θ¯−x∗(θ)
A˜
θ¯−θ M , and their θ is uniformly distributed
over
[
x∗(θ)
A˜
, θ¯
]
in the next period. In period t + 1, the survivers offer x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
. Because
x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
< x∗(θ) by lemma 4, for all θ ∈
[
x∗(θ)
A˜
, θ¯
]
, A˜θ > x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
. Thus, the survivers
stay in the economy for all succeeding periods without defaults by offering x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
. The
mass of defaulters is
x∗(θ)
A˜
−θ
θ¯−θ M , and they are replaced with new entrepreneurs in the next
period. Let △ ≡
x∗(θ)
A˜
−θ
θ¯−θ . Notice that △ ∈ (0, 1) since x
∗(θ)
A˜
∈ (θ, θ¯). Using this fact and
Ω0 = U[θ,θ¯], Ωt consists of U[θ,θ¯] with mass △t and U[x∗(θ)
A˜
,θ¯] with mass 1−△t, that is,
Ωt
(
θ|A˜
)
=
 △
t · θ−θ
θ¯−θ if θ ∈
[
θ, x
∗(θ)
A˜
)
△t · θ−θ
θ¯−θ + (1−△t) θA˜−x
∗(θ)
θ¯A˜−x∗(θ) if θ ∈
[
x∗(θ)
A˜
, θ¯
]
.
(20)
Substituting (20) into (11), we obtain the aggregate production as
Ŷt
(
A˜
)
= △t1
2
A˜(θ¯ + θ) +
(
1−△t) 1
2
(
A˜θ¯ + x∗(θ)
)
,
which finishes the proof.
Proof of proposition 6. First, assume that A˜ ∈
[
x∗(θ)
θ
, 1
]
. If A′ ∈
[
0, x
∗(θ)
θ¯
)
∪
[
x∗(θ)
θ
, A˜
)
,
then by proposition 4-1, Ωt = U[θ,θ¯] and hence Yt(A˜
′) = A˜(θ+θ¯)
2
for all t ≥ s + 1. Now
suppose that A′ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
. According to the proof of proposition 4, Ωs+1 consists of
θ−x∗(θ)
A′
θ−θ mass of survivers whose θ is uniformly distributed over
[
x∗(θ)
A′
, θ¯
]
and
x∗(θ)
A′
−θ
θ−θ mass
new entrepreneurs, and they offer x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A′
)
and x∗(θ), respectively in the next period t+1.
Because As+1 = A˜ ≥ x
∗(θ)
θ
so that A˜θ ≥ x∗(θ) > x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A′
)
, all the entrepreneurs at period
s + 1 stay in the economy for all succeeding periods. Thus, Ŷt(A
′) = △1
2
A˜(θ¯ + θ) + (1 −
△)1
2
A˜
(
θ¯ + x
∗(θ)
A′
)
for all t ≥ s+1. Letting △′ = min
{
1,
x∗(θ)
A′
−θ
θ¯−θ
}
and rearranging the above
analysis, we obtain the first part of proposition 4.
Second, assume that A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
. By proposition 4-2 Ωs = U[θ˜,θ¯], where θ˜ ≡
x∗(θ)
A˜
,
and every entrepreneur offers x∗
(
θ˜
)
at period s. If A′θ˜ ≥ x∗
(
θ˜
)
, then all the entrepreneurs
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survive so that Ωt = U[θ˜,θ¯] and Yt(A˜
′) =
A˜(θ˜+θ¯)
2
for all t ≥ s+1. If A′θ¯ < x∗
(
θ˜
)
, then all the
entrepreneurs default at period s so that Ωs+1 = U[θ,θ¯]. Then, by proposition 4-2, Ŷt
(
A˜
)
=
△t−s−1 A˜(θ+θ¯)
2
+ [1−△t−s−1] x∗(θ)+A˜θ¯
2
for t ≥ s + 1. Finally consider the case that A′ ∈[
x∗(θ˜)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
. In this case, entrepreneurs with θ ∈
[
θ˜, x
∗(θ˜)
A′
)
default and are replaced with
new entrepreneurs in period s+1, and the other entrepreneurs with θ ∈
[
x∗(θ˜)
A′
, θ¯
]
survive. The
mass of defaulted and survived entrepreneurs are given as
x∗(θ˜)
A′
−θ˜
θ¯−θ˜ and
θ¯−x
∗(θ˜)
A′
θ¯−θ˜ , respectively.
Then, Ωt =
x∗(θ˜)
A′
−θ˜
θ¯−θ˜
{
△t−s−1U[θ,θ¯] + [1−△t−s−1]U[θ˜,θ¯]
}
U[θ,θ¯] +
θ¯−x
∗(θ˜)
A′
θ¯−θ˜ U
[
x∗(θ˜)
A′
,θ¯
] for t ≥ s+ 1.
Thus, Yt(A˜
′) =
x∗(θ˜)
A′
−θ˜
θ¯−θ˜
[
△t−s−1 A˜(θ+θ¯)
2
+ [1−△t−s−1] x∗(θ)+A˜θ¯
2
]
+
θ¯−x
∗(θ˜)
A′
θ¯−θ˜
A˜
2
[
x∗(θ˜)
A′
+ θ¯
]
. Letting
△˜′ = min
{
1,
x∗(θ˜)
A′
−θ˜
θ¯−θ˜
}
and rearranging the above analysis, we obtain the second part of
proposition 4.
Third, suppose that A˜ ∈
(
0, x
∗(θ¯)
θ
]
. In this case, all entrepreneurs default every period
including the period when the shock arrives. Thus, Ωt = U[θ,θ¯] and Yt(A˜
′) = A˜(θ+θ¯)
2
for all
t ≥ s+ 1.
Proof of proposition 7. Because
∑s−1
t=0 β
tŶt(A˜
′) =
∑s−1
t=0 β
tŶt(A˜), if Ŷt(A˜
′) ≤ Ŷt(A˜) for
all t ≥ s + 1, then ∑∞t=0 βt[Ŷt(A′) − Ŷt(A˜)] < 0. Thus, by the results of proposition 6,
it suffices to focus on two cases: 1) A˜ ∈
[
x∗(θ)
θ
, 1
]
with a shock A′ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
and 2)
A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
with a shock A′ ∈
(
x∗(θ˜)
θ¯
,
x∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
.
First, consider the case with A˜ ∈
[
x∗(θ)
θ
, 1
]
and A′ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
. Using the results of
proposition 6, we obtain β−s
∑∞
t=0 β
t[Ŷt(A
′)−Ŷt(A˜)] = (A′−A˜) θ¯+θ2 + β1−β
θ¯−x∗(θ)
A′
θ¯−θ
A˜
2
(
x∗(θ)
A′
− θ
)
.
Because A′ < x
∗(θ)
θ
and A′ − A˜ < 0, ∑∞t=0 βt[Ŷt(A′) − Ŷt(A˜)] > 0 if and only if β >
θ¯2−θ2
θ¯2−θ2+ A˜
A˜−A′
·(θ¯−x∗(θ)A′ )(
x∗(θ)
A′
−θ)
. Because θ¯
2−θ2
θ¯2−θ2+ A˜
A˜−A′
·(θ¯−x∗(θ)A′ )(
x∗(θ)
A′
−θ)
< 1, there exists β such
that I(A˜, β) is nonempty. We show that if I(A˜, β) is nonempty then it is an open in-
terval. Notice that A′ ∈ I(A˜, β) if and only if F1(A′) ≡ A′2(A′ − A˜)(θ¯2 − θ2) + βA˜1−β ·(
A′θ¯ − x∗(θ)) (x∗(θ)− A′θ) > 0, where F1(A′) is a cubic function ofA′. Note that F1 (x∗(θ)θ¯ ) <
0 and F1
(
x∗(θ)
θ
)
< 0. Thus, whenever I(A˜, β) 6= ∅, there exist A′1 ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
such
that F1(A
′
1) > 0 and F
′
1(A
′
1) = 0 and A
′
2 > A
′
1 such that F1(A
′
2) < 0 and F
′
1(A
′
2) = 0.
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Then, there exist A′′1 ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, A′1
)
and A′′2 ∈
(
A′1,min
{
A′2,
x∗(θ)
θ
})
such that F1(A
′′
1) =
F1(A
′′
2) = 0 and I(A˜, β) = (A
′′
1, A
′′
2) Thus, I(A˜, β) is an open interval. Next, take any
A˜1, A˜2 ∈
[
x∗(θ)
θ
, 1
]
such that A˜2 > A˜1. Suppose that A
′ ∈ I(A˜2, β) which implies that
β > θ¯
2−θ2
θ¯2−θ2+ A˜2
A˜2−A
′
·(θ¯−x∗(θ)A′ )(
x∗(θ)
A′
−θ)
. Because A˜
A˜−A′ decreases in A˜ given that A˜ > A
′, we have
β > θ¯
2−θ2
θ¯2−θ2+ A˜1
A˜1−A
′
·(θ¯−x∗(θ)A′ )(
x∗(θ)
A′
−θ)
so that A′ ∈ I(A˜1, β). Thus, I(A˜2, β) ⊂ I(A˜1, β).
Second, consider the case with A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
and A′ ∈
(
x∗(θ˜)
θ¯
,
x∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
. Define a
function of A′ as
p(A′) =
x∗(θ˜)
A′
− θ˜
θ¯ − θ˜
=
x∗
(
θ˜
)
A˜
A′
− x∗ (θ)
A˜θ¯ − x∗(θ)
. (21)
Then, from proposition 6, we obtain
∞∑
t=s
βt−sŶt(A′) = Ŷs(A′) + β
∞∑
t=s+1
βt−s−1Ŷt(A′)
=
1
2
(Aθ¯ + x∗(θ))− βp(A
′)
1− β△ ·
1
2
[x∗(θ)− A˜θ]
+
β
1− β
1
2
[
A˜θ¯ + x∗(θ) + (1− p(A′))
(
x∗
(
θ˜
) A˜
A′
− x∗(θ)
)]
. (22)
From (22) and the fact that Ŷt(A˜) =
A˜(θ+θ¯)
2
for all t > s, we obtain
F2(A
′) ≡ 1
βs
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtŶt(A
′)−
∞∑
t=0
βtŶt(A˜)
]
=
θ¯
2
(A′ − A˜)− β
1− β△
p(A′)
2
[x∗(θ)− A˜θ]
+
β
1− β
1− p(A′)
2
(
x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
A˜
A′
− x∗(θ)
)
. (23)
Taking a derivative F2(A
′), we obtain
F ′2(A
′) =
θ¯
2
+
βx∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
A˜
A′2
2(1− β)(A˜θ¯ − x∗(θ))
 (1−β)(x∗(θ)−A˜θ)1−β△
+2x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
A˜
A′
− x∗(θ)− A˜θ¯
 (24)
45
Note that A′2F2(A′) is cubic polonomial, and from (23) and (24), it can be verified that
F2
(
x∗(θ˜)
θ¯
)
< 0, F2
(
x∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
< 0, and F ′2
(
x∗(θ˜)
θ¯
)
> 0. This implies that F ′2
(
x∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
< 0
then F2 is single-peaked in
(
x∗(θ˜)
θ¯
,
x∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
, so that there exists A∗ ∈
(
x∗(θ˜)
θ¯
,
x∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
such
that F2(A
′) is maximized at A∗. Therefore, if F ′2
(
x∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
< 0 and F2(A
∗) > 0, I(A˜, β)
is a nonempty open subinterval of
(
x∗(θ˜)
θ¯
,
x∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
. From (24), we obtain F ′2
(
x∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
=
θ¯
2
+
βx∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
A˜
A′2
2(1−β)(A˜θ¯−x∗(θ))
[
(1−β)(x∗(θ)−A˜θ)
1−β△ − (A˜θ¯ − x∗(θ))
]
. Given that A˜θ < x∗(θ) < A˜θ¯ and 1−β
1−β△ ∈
(0, 1), if A˜ is sufficiently high in the range of
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
, then (1−β)(x
∗(θ)−A˜θ)
1−β△ < A˜θ¯− x∗(θ).
At the same, if β is also sufficiently high then F ′2
(
x∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
< 0. Using the fact that F ′2(A
∗) =
0⇔ x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
A˜
A∗
− x∗(θ) = 1
2
(A˜θ¯− x∗(θ))− 1−β
1−β△
1
2
(x∗(θ)− A˜θ)− (1−β)(A˜θ¯−x∗(θ))θ¯
2βx∗(x
∗(θ)
A˜
) A˜
A∗2
, we obtain
F2(A
∗) =
θ¯
2
(A∗ − A˜)− 1− p(A
∗)
4
A∗θ¯(A˜θ¯ − x∗(θ))
x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
A˜
A∗
+
[
β
1− β ·
1− p(A∗)
4
(A˜θ¯ − x∗(θ))− β
1− β△
1 + p(A∗)
4
(x∗(θ)− A˜θ)
]
=
θ¯
2
(A∗ − A˜)− A
∗θ¯
4
 A∗θ¯
x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
) − 1

+
β
1− β
1
4
(
A˜θ¯ − x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
A˜
A∗
)
− 1− β
1− β△
A˜+ x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
− 2x∗(θ)
4
 . (25)
As A˜ → x∗(θ)
θ
and β → 1, the value of (25) converges to x∗(θ)
4θ
(
θ¯ − x∗(θ)
A∗
)
, which is strictly
positive because A∗ >
x∗
(
x∗(θ)
A˜
)
θ¯
. Therefore, if A˜ ∈
(
x∗(θ)
θ¯
, x
∗(θ)
θ
)
and β are sufficiently high,
then F2(A
∗) > 0. Thus, there exists an open interval I(A˜, β) ∈
(
x∗(θ˜)
θ¯
,
x∗(θ˜)
θ˜
)
.
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Appendix B
In this section, we show the existence of multiple full production equilibria. For this purpose,
we define a correspondence χ : Θ→ R+ such that, for all θ′ ∈ Θ,
χ(θ′) =
{
x ∈ R+ : x∗(θ′) ≤ x < min
{
x∗∗,
b(θ′)
2
,
βθ′
2
}}
(26)
where x∗∗ = min
{
x : x− ln
(
θ¯+θ
2
)
−ln(θ)
θ¯+θ
2
−θ x
2 ≥ r
}
. Note that x∗(θ) < x∗∗ because
ln
(
θ¯+θ
2
)
−ln θ
θ¯+θ
2
−θ >
ln θ¯−ln θ
θ¯−θ and x
∗(θ) = min
{
x : x− ln θ¯−ln θ
θ¯−θ x
2 ≥ r
}
. Furthermore, x∗(θ′) < min
{
b(θ′)
2
, βθ
′
2
}
for
any θ′ ∈ Θ by definition of x∗(·) in (6). Consequently, x∗(θ′) < min
{
x∗∗, b(θ
′)
2
, βθ
′
2
}
and
hence χ(θ′) 6= ∅ for all θ′ ∈ Θ.
We call the profile of entrepreneurs’ strategies {xt, Dt}∞t=0 “χ-strategy profile” if it satisfies
the following conditions: For any (ot−1,At−1) ∈ O∗ × A, if Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1) = U[θ′,θ] for some
θ′ ∈ Θ, then for all θ ∈ [θ′, θ], a type (θ,ot−1) entrepreneur offers x̂(ot−1,At−1) ∈ χ(θ′),
and chooses the default set as Dt =
[
0, x̂(ot−1,At−1)
θ
)
. Note that there exists a continuum
of “χ-strategy profile” because the set χ(θ̂), defined in (26), is uncountable. To show the
existence of multiple equilibria, we show that for any χ-strategy profile, there exists a belief
system and corresponding lender’s strategy that support entrepreneurs’ strategies in that
profile as best responses in the next proposition.
Proposition 8 For any χ-strategy profile {xt, Dt}∞t=0, there exists a belief system Φ such
that 〈{xt, Dt} ,B∗t (Φ, ·, ·),Φ〉∞t=0 is a full production equilibrium.
Proof. Take any χ-strategy profile {xt, Dt}∞t=0. We say that a lender’s strategy accepts the
χ-strategy profile, {xt, Dt}∞t=0, if it accepts all x̂(ot−1,At−1) for any (ot−1,At−1) ∈ O∗ × A
with the property that there exists θ′ ∈ Θ such that Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1) = U[θ′,θ]. Now consider
a lender’s strategy Bt that accepts {xt, Dt}∞t=0. Let ÔA ⊂ O × A be all the feasible pairs of
operation history and aggregate shock history generated by 〈{xt, Dt} ,Bt〉∞t=0.13
13There are (ot−1,At−1) ∈ O∗t−1 × At−1 that cannot be generated by 〈{xt, Dt} ,Bt〉∞t=0. For example,
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Then, for any (ot−1,At−1) ∈ ÔA such that Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1) = U[θ̂t,θ] for some θ̂t ∈ Θ, all
entrepreneurs with ot−1 offers x̂(ot−1,At−1) and defaults only ifAt <
xt(ot−1,At−1)
θ
under the χ-
strategy profile. Thus, Γ̂t+1(ot−1∪{1},At−1∪{At}) = U[θ̂t+1,θ¯] for each At ∈
(
x̂(ot−1,At−1)
θ¯
, 1
]
where θ̂t+1 = max
{
θ̂t,
x̂(ot−1,At−1)
At
}
, and x̂(ot−1 ∪ {1},At−1 ∪ {At}) is also well defined.
Because Γ̂0(o−1,A−1) = U[θ,θ¯], these results implies that 1) ÔA ⊂ O∗ × A and 2) for all
(ot−1,At−1) ∈ ÔA, there exists θ̂(ot−1,At−1) such that Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1) = U[θ̂(ot−1,At−1),θ] by
induction as explained in the proof of claim 1. The value of θ̂(ot−1,At−1) is given recursively.
Specifically, suppose that entrepreneurs in the ot−1-group were born at period s < t and
let oτ−1 and Aτ−1 be the truncated subsequences of ot−1 and At−1 for each τ < t, such
that oh and Ah are removed for all h > τ . Then, θ̂(os−1,As−1) = θ and θ̂(oτ−1,Aτ−1) =
max
{
x̂(oτ−2,Aτ−2)
Aτ−2
, θ̂(oτ−2,Aτ−2)
}
for all τ = s+1, . . . , t. Consequently, x̂(ot−1,At−1) is well
defined for all (ot−1,At−1) ∈ ÔA, because Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1) = U[θ̂(ot−1,At−1),θ].
Now construct a belief system Φ such that
Φ(x,ot−1,At−1) =

U[θ̂(ot−1,At−1),θ]
U[
θ,
θ¯+θ
2
]
if x ≥ x̂(ot−1,At−1) and (ot−1,At−1) ∈ ÔA
otherwise.
(27)
We first show that B∗t (Φ, ·, ·) accepts {xt, Dt}∞t=0. Take any (ot−1,At−1) ∈ ÔA. The lender’s
expected payoff by accepting an offer x < x̂(ot−1,At−1) from an entrepreneur with ot−1
satisfies
∫
[
θ,
θ¯+θ
2
]
∫
[0,1]\Dθ
xdU(At)dU[θ, θ¯+θ
2
](θ) ≤ max
x<x∗∗
∫
[
θ,
θ¯+θ
2
]
∫
[xθ ,1]
xdU(At)dU[θ, θ¯+θ
2
](θ)
= max
x<x∗∗
x− ln
(
θ¯+θ
2
)
− ln(θ)
θ¯+θ
2
− θ
x2
 < r,
which implies that minB∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1) ≥ x̂(ot−1,At−1). On the other hand, the lender’s
expected payoff by accepting the offer x̂(ot−1,At−1) from an entrepreneur with ot−1 is, de-
({∅, 1}, {∅, 0}) is not feasible since A0 = 0 results in all the entrepreneurs default for sure.
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noting θ̂ = θ̂(ot−1,At−1) to save space,
∫
[θ̂,θ¯]
∫
[0,1]\
[
0,
x̂(ot−1,At−1)
θ
) x̂(ot−1,At−1)dU(At)dU[θ̂,θ¯](θ) = x̂(ot−1,At−1)−
(x̂(ot−1,At−1))
2
b(θ̂)
because Φ(x̂(ot−1,At−1),ot−1,At−1) = U[θ̂,θ¯]. Note that x − x
2
b(θ̂)
increases in x whenever
x < b(θˆ)
2
, and that x∗(θˆ) − (x
∗(θˆ))
2
b(θˆ)
= r. Therefore x̂(ot−1,At−1) − (x̂(ot−1,At−1))
2
b(θˆ)
≥ r since
x∗(θˆ) ≤ x̂(ot−1,At−1) < b(θˆ)2 , which in turn implies minB∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1) = x̂(ot−1,At−1).
We finally show that 〈{xt, Dt} ,Bt,Φ〉∞t=0, where Bt = B∗t (Φ, ·, ·), is a full production
equilibrium.14 First, note that because B∗t (Φ, ·, ·) accepts {xt, Dt}∞t=0, as shown above, for
each (ot−1,At−1) ∈ ÔA, Γ̂t(ot−1,At−1) = U[θ̂(ot−1,At−1),θ] and all the entrepreneurs with
ot−1 offer x̂(ot−1,At−1). Furthermore, by construction of the correspondence χ in (26),
x̂(ot−1,At−1) <
βθ̂(ot−1,At−1)
2
. Thus, the optimal default strategy after making the contract
x̂(ot−1,At−1) is the minimum default set, i.e, Dt =
[
0, x̂(ot−1,At−1)
θ
)
, as explained in the proof
of proposition 1.
Next, given the result of lemma 2, it is optimal for an entrepreneur with ot−1 to offer
x̂(ot−1,At−1) = minB∗t (Φ,ot−1,At−1) if he/she chose to make an offer. Moreover, by the
same logic in the proof of proposition 1, it can be verified that it is optimal for an entrepreneur
with ot−1 to make the offer x̂(ot−1,At−1) instead of not making an offer given the lender’s
strategy as Bt= B∗t (Φ, ·, ·). Consequently, the χ-strategy is a best response to the lenders’
strategy. By setting Bt= B∗t (Φ, ·, ·) with Φ given by (27), the lender’s strategy Bt is also a
best response to the χ-strategy of entrepreneurs. Finally, the belief system Φ, constructed
by (27), is consistent given the profile of strategies 〈{xt, Dt} ,Bt〉∞t=0.
14Since B∗t (Φ, ·, ·) accepts {xt, Dt}∞t=0, every entrepreneur offers a contract at every period.
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